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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k). This case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court.
Final judgment was entered in the Third Judicial District Order, in and for Summit County on
August 20, 1993, and defendants' Notice of Appeal was filed on September 7, 1993.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues on appeal are (1) whether the District Court correctly ruled, as a matter
of law, that defendant/appellee Robert L. Warburton's ("Warburton") Jeremy Ranch Lot
Reservation Agreement ("Warburton LRA") created an easement in gross; and (2) whether the
District Court correctly ruled that defendant/appellant Virginia Beach Federal Savings & Loan
Association ("VBF") had actual or constructive notice of the Warburton LRA, or was placed on
inquiry notice of Warburton's LRA.
This appeal follows a grant of summary judgment in favor of Warburton. On review, the
Court of Appeals must affirm summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and Warburton is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baumgart v. Utah Farm
Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647 (Utah App. 1993). The standard of review is the correctness
of the trial court's conclusions, according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.
Loosli v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 849 P.2d 624 (Utah App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
A.

Warburton's LRA created an easement in gross. Maw v. Weber Basin Water

Conservancy Dist., 20 Utah 2d 195, 436 P.2d 230 (1968); High v. Davis, et a/., 283 Or. 315,
s-\alr\34850

584 P.2d 725 (1978); Bradley v. Frazier Playgrounds, 110 Cal. App. 2d 436, 242 P.2d 958
(1952).
B.

VBF had actual, constructive or inquiry notice of Warburton's interest, Stumph

v. Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1987); Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983); Toland
v. Corey Co., 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890); Salt Lake v. Garfield & Western Railway Co., 291
P.2d 883 (Utah 1955); High v. Davis, 283 Or. 315, 584 P.2d 725 (1978); Bradley v. Frazier
Park Playgrounds, 110 Cal. App. 2d 436, 242 P.2d 958 (1952).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.

This is an action seeking a determination as to whether

Warburton has a continuing, real property interest in the Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country Club.
B.

Course of Proceedings. This action was begun in 1988, when Warburton and 179

others ("plaintiffs") sought to enjoin defendant VBF's impending foreclosure of the Jeremy
Ranch development (including the golf course). When injunctive relief was denied, VBF
foreclosed. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the
issue of whether the plaintiffs held easements in the golf course which survived VBF's
foreclosure.
The cross-motions for partial summary judgment were decided in plaintiffs' favor in 1991.
Subsequently, plaintiffs sought two additional summary determinations:

(1) that the Lot

Reservation Agreements created a perpetual easement, and (2) that the 1991 summary judgment
applied to specific plaintiffs, including Warburton. Defendants applied to the District Court for
reconsideration of the 1991 summary judgment. Defendants concede that Warburton's LRA is
s \alr\34850
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perpetual. On January 19, 1993, the District Court granted partial summary judgment holding
that the 1991 summary judgment applied specifically to Warburton. The Court also denied
defendants' motion for reconsideration. Other issues remained and went to trial in 1993.
C.

Disposition by District Court. The District Court granted plaintiffs' Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and denied VBF's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ruling that
the sample Lot Reservation Agreement did grant an easement, and that such easement survived
the foreclosure.
A later ruling by the District Court specifically determined that Warburton's LRA created
a perpetual easement in gross.
Before trial, VBF moved for reconsideration of the District Court's ruling on the CrossMotions for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 2581), arguing that fact issues over notice precluded
Partial Summary Judgment and that the District Court erred in considering extrinsic evidence.
VBF's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
After trial, Judgment and Findings were entered which incorporated the earlier Orders of
Partial Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In or before 1979, The Jeremy Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, commenced the

development of Jeremy Ranch, a residential real estate development to be associated with a
golfing club. Gerald H. Bagley was the sole general partner of The Jeremy Ltd. (Aff. T.
Bagley, R. 432-440; Aff. G. H. Bagley, R. 798-806).

s:\air\34850
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2.

In conjunction with the sale of residential lots, The Jeremy Ltd. coupled perpetual

memberships, known as "Founding Memberships," in a to-be-established Jeremy Ranch Golf and
Country Club. (Aff. T. Bagley, R. 432-440; Aff. G. H. Bagley, R. 798-806).
3.

These Founding Memberships were established by written agreements entitled "Lot

Reservation Agreements" ("LRAs"), modeled after a "sample LRA" that was attached to
defendants' brief as Exhibit D.
4.

Under this generic LRA, the purchaser acquired a reservation of a lot in the proposed

subdivision surrounding the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, and a membership in the Jeremy Ranch
Golf and Country Club as follows:
2. Club Memberships. It is understood that a Lifetime Family Membership in
The Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country Club is included with the purchase of a lot on
the Jeremy Ranch. There are no monthly dues, nor can any dues ever be assessed.
This Membership is transferable. It may be sold without a transfer fee. It is not
assessable.
5.

On January 10th, 1981, Warburton entered into an LRA (R. 1171 - attached hereto

as Exhibit 1) for the reservation of one lot with a total purchase price of $50,000. Warburton's
LRA, however, differed substantially from the sample LRA in that it was expressly "perpetual"
rather than lifetime, included "all Jeremy Ranch Club facilities," and was expressly binding upon
"other owners, successors or assigns of the club." Warburton's LRA reads as follows:
2. Club Membership. It is understood that a perpetual Family Membership in
The Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country Club including all Jeremy Ranch Club facilities
is included with the purchase of a lot on The Jeremy Ranch. There are no monthly
dues, nor can any dues ever be assessed. This membership is transferable. It may
be sold without a transfer fee. It is not assessable. The obligations and provisions
to the members of the club shall be binding upon any other owners, successors or
assigns of the club.
s:\alr\34850
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(Emphasis on additional language.) Warburton's LRA was subscribed by Gerald H. Bagley.
Warburton paid $25,000 down. (Aff. Thomas Bagley, R. 445).
6.

Purchasers under the LRAs, including Warburton, were told that the rights granted

by The Jeremy Ltd. under the LRAs were perpetual rights to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course,
clubhouse and facilities without regard to whom or what entity owned the property. (Aff. G.
Bagley, R, 801-802).
7.

Warburton's $25,000 down payment was for the golf membership and was used to

help pay for the completion of the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. (Aff. T. Bagley, R. 443).
8.

During the spring and summer of 1982, The Jeremy Ltd., Gerald Bagley's

partnership, began negotiations and discussions relative to arranging a loan from VBF through
its agent, Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards Woodbury"), for construction
of improvements to the residential subdivision surrounding the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course.
(Aff. of T. Bagley; R. 435, 436; Aff. August Brand R. 2745).
9.

Although the original loan documents were in the name of Richards Woodbury, VBF

and its participating lenders funded the loan and Richards Woodbury only acted as the agent of
VBF with respect to the loan. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 435, 436; Aff. August Brand R. 2745).
10. Under the standard LRA, the initial payment of $25,000 was for the golfing rights
under the golf membership and an additional amount of $25,000 was payable for the purchase
of a lot when the lot improvements were completed and county approval received for the
subdivision. If the Founding Member did not make the additional payment and purchase a lot,
the member could either continue to hold the golf membership in exchange for the initial
s:\alr\34850
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$25,000 payment or receive a refund of the $25,000 with interest in exchange for the
membership rights. (Exhibit A to Defendants' Brief).
11. VBF indicated to representatives of The Jeremy Ltd. that the existence of the LRA and
the additional income from lot sales to Founding Members was a primary factor to VBF in
determining whether to make the loan. This was because of the LRA provisions for payment
of additional funds in the event the parties to such LRAs exercised the lot reservations and
purchased lots in the subdivisions surrounding the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. (Aff. of T.
Bagley, R. 435).
12. Prior to closing the subject loan, VBF discussed directly with representatives of The
Jeremy Ltd. the existence of the LRAs which would be security for the loan and also discussed
the existence of lifetime, dues-free memberships to the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. (Aff. of T.
Bagley, R. 435, 436).
13. In August 1982, representatives of VBF and the secondary lenders attended the first
annual Jeremy Ranch Golf Tournament at the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. While at the golf
course, these representatives discussed the LRAs and the existence and rights of the golf course
memberships with representatives of The Jeremy Ltd. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 435, 436).
14. Prior to the loan closing, The Jeremy Ltd. delivered all the original LRAs, including
Warburton's, to VBF's agent Richards Woodbury.-' Copies of the LRAs were made and the
-

There remains a question of fact as to whether all the LRAs, including Warburton's, were
delivered to VBF prior to closing. August Brand, Richards Woodbury's Senior Vice
President, asserts in his affidavit (R. 2745, 2746) that all the LRAs were delivered by
Richards Woodbury to VBF. VBF denies this. There is no dispute, however, that VBF's
agent, Richards Woodbury, had all the LRAs prior to closing.
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originals returned to The Jeremy Ltd. In September 1982, three months prior to the loan,
Richards Woodbury conducted a survey of the parties to the LRA agreements to determine the
number intending to purchase a lot. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 435; Aff. of A. Brand, R. 2745).
15. On November 26, 1982, Richards Woodbury entered into a Security Agreement (the
"Security Agreement") with The Jeremy Ltd., granting and assigning all The Jeremy Ltd.'s
interest in all the existing and future LRAs to Richards Woodbury as security for the loan. This
Security Agreement was then assigned to VBF. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 435; Aff. of A. Brand,
R. 2746).
16. On November 26, 1982, and in connection with the Security Agreement, The Jeremy
Ltd. entered into an Assignment of Lot Reservation Agreements ("Assignment of LRAs") to
Richards Woodbury, which Assignment of LRAs was then assigned to VBF. (Aff. of T.
Bagley, R. 436; Aff. A. Brand, R. 2746; Assignment of LRAs attached to Defendants' Brief
as Exhibit E).
17. The sample LRA form was attached to the Assignment of LRAs.
18. The Assignment of LRAs also included an attached Exhibit "A" which listed and
identified 169 individuals or entities, including Warburton, which had entered into LRAs
granting rights to use the golf course. The list also indicated LRAs had been entered into with
respect to 208 lots. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 437; Aff. August Brand, R. 2746).
19. On December 6, 1982, trust deeds were recorded in favor of Richards Woodbury with
respect to the loan. (Aff. of T. Bagley, R. 438; Aff. A. Brand, R. 2747).

s:\alr\34850
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20. In October of 1988, plaintiffs learned of a Notice of Default Trustee's Sale served by
VBF on its subsidiary JSC. Plaintiffs then filed their Complaint in this action and on October
25, 1988, plaintiffs recorded their Lis Pendens in the records of the Summit County Recorder,
Book 498, Page 309-10, relative to plaintiffs' rights to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. (R.
1-38).
21. On November 28, 1988, VBF foreclosed under the above Trust Deeds and purchased
the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, Clubhouse and facilities at the Trustee's Sale. (VBF Answer,
par. 29, R. 119).
22. On August 22, 1991, the lower court entered its Order of Summary Judgment (Exhibit
2, R. 840-843) ruling that, based upon the sample LRA, the original plaintiffs, including
Warburton, hold easements in gross in the property described as the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course
and Clubhouse facilities that were not extinguished by VBF's foreclosure.
23. On January 15, 1993, the lower court entered its Minute Entry (Exhibit 3, R. 31123118), ruling inter alia:
a.

Granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment applying the

August 22, 1991 ruling to certain specific plaintiffs, including Warburton, based upon
their respective individual LRAs;
b.

Denying defendant's motion for reconsideration of the August 22, 1991

order; and
c.

s \alr\34850
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Utah law, Warburton's LRA creates in him a perpetual real estate interest in and to
the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course and related facilities that survives VBF's foreclosure.
Warburton's LRA differs substantially from the sample LRA in that it is expressly "perpetual,"
applies to related facilities and is expressly binding upon future "owners, successors or assigns
of the club."
Warburton's LRA is not defeated by the statute of frauds. It is sufficiently descriptive of
the parties, interest conveyed and property involved. Given the differing interpretations placed
upon Warburton's LRA by the defendants, it was proper for the lower court to consider
extraneous evidence as to contractual intent. Specifically, it was proper for the lower court to
consider the affidavits of the Bagleys in interpreting Warburton's LRA.
Even if Warburton's LRA does not fully comply with the statute of frauds, Warburton
nonetheless has an equitable easement because of his financial contribution to the creation of the
golf course, coupled with the written and oral representations of The Jeremy Ltd.
VBF had actual, constructive or inquiry notice of Warburton's LRA prior to the closing.
Any remaining questions of fact are not determinative of these issues. Consequently, as a matter
of law, VBF foreclosure does not eliminate Warburton's easement.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This is defendants' appeal from the lower court's determination that Warburton continues
to hold a real property interest (easement in gross) in and to the Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country
s:\alr\34850
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Club. In challenging this determination, defendants disregard three significant and determinative
factors. First, defendants base their entire argument upon a generic "sample LRA," and fail to
mention the only LRA before the Court, i.e., Warburton's. Second, appellants disregard the
fact that Warburton's substantial payments were used for the construction and development of
the golf club. Third, appellants contend that, because they were not informed of the precise
"label" for Warburton's interest, they are not charged with notice even though they were
informed of and had access to the document creating Warburton's interest.
More detailed arguments follow. However, on the front end of this brief it may be helpful
to apprise the Court of the following:
(1) Warburton's LRA
Examination of Warburton's LRA reveals significant and determinative
differences from the sample LRA. These differences were the result of negotiation.
Instead of a lifetime membership, Warburton's LRA is expressly "perpetual." Rather
than an interest in just the golf club, Warburton's LRA applies to "all Jeremy Ranch
facilities." Third, and unlike the sample LRA, Warburton's LRA expressly provides
that the interest thereby created "shall be binding upon any other owners, successors
or assigns of the club."
(2) Appellants would have the Court believe that Warburton's "membership"
is nothing more than any other country club membership.

To the contrary,

Warburton's membership was an integral part of the development of Jeremy Ranch
Golf Club. It is a perpetual, transferable interest in real property. The Founding
s:\alr\34850
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Members' front-end payments were used for the creation of the golf course, without
which there would have been no Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country Club.
(3) Appellants contend that, because the sample LRA or Warburton's LRA did
not expressly state that they created an "easement," they are somehow relieved of the
fact that they knew, before the closing, of the existence of and language creating the
Founding Members' interests. The absence of a "label" does not alter the fact of
notice.
I.

WARBURTON HOLDS AN AFFIRMATIVE EASEMENT IN GROSS THAT
SURVIVES VBF'S FORECLOSURE.
Confronted with first the sample LRA, and thereafter Warburton's LRA, the lower court

ruled that Warburton holds a perpetual easement in gross in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Club that
survives VBF's foreclosure.
It is axiomatic that an easement is created when one is granted a right to use the property
of another for some specific purpose. Restatement of Property, Section 450(a) (1944); Kuhlman
v. Rivera, 701 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1985); Laurence v. Kruckmeyer, 605 P.2d 466 (Ariz. 1979).
An "affirmative" easement is one which grants the right to enter and make active use of the
servient estate. Rahabiv. Morrison, 440 N.Y.S.2d941 (N.Y.A.D. 1981). Additionally, "[a]n
affirmative easement entitles the owner thereof to use the land subject to the easement by doing
acts which, were it not for the easement, he would not be privileged to do." Restatement of
Property, Section 451 (1944). An easement is said to be "in gross" where it is a personal right
to use the property of another rather than a right appurtenant to any dominant estate or land
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possessed by the easement holder. Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984); Restatement
of Property, Section 454 (1944); Evans v. Holloway Sand & Gravel Inc., 308 N.W.2d 440
(Mich. 1981).
Warburton's rights in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, clubhouse and facilities constitute an
affirmative easement in gross. Warburton was granted a perpetual right to use the Jeremy Ranch
Golf Course, clubhouse and facilities. Such right is personal to Warburton and his family
independent of any property ownership and could be transferred. The Jeremy Ltd. granted such
rights as perpetual rights to use the golf course and facilities regardless of subsequent owners
of the property. Unlike the sample LRA, Warburton's LRA expressly provides that those
perpetual rights "shall be binding upon any other owners, successors or assigns of the club."
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar case in Maw v. Weber Basin Water
Conservancy Dist., 20 Utah 2d 195, 436 P.2d 230 (1968), where it held that shooting privileges
at a gun club were in the nature of an affirmative easement in gross. In that case, the Ogden
Duck Club entered into an agreement with grantor Annie C. Maw to acquire a right of way over
Maw's property in exchange for which it provided grantor's named sons non-assessable shooting
privileges on the shooting grounds of the gun club. The agreement further provided that in any
year the shooting privileges of the named sons could be transferred to one designated grandson.
With respect to these rights to use the gun club, the Utah Supreme Court classified the right to
the use of the property as an easement in gross:
There was before the trial court a clear and unambiguous agreement which expressly
granted shooting privileges to designated individuals. This shooting privilege was in
the nature of a non-commercial easement in gross....
s:\alr\34850
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Id. at 197 (Emphasis added).
Other jurisdictions have arrived at similar conclusions. In High v. Davis, et al., 283 Or.
315, 584 P.2d 725 (1978) (Exhibit 4), the issue before the court was whether membership
agreements conveying exclusive hunting, fishing and recreational rights conveyed interests in
land that would have priority over all but bona fide purchasers without notice of interests. As
part of the overall sale of a development, Davis sold property that was coupled with
memberships that provided for the exclusive right to hunt, fish and use the property in
perpetuity. After the sale of some memberships, the development ran into financial trouble.
On the question of priorities, the court held that the memberships, because of "the element of
participation in the soil," created an interest in the land itself.
In Bradley v. Frazier Park Playgrounds, 110 Cal. App. 2d 436, 242 P.2d 958 (1952)
(Exhibit 5), the California appellate court was faced with a case remarkably similar to the instant
one. Bradley involved a real estate promotion. As an integral part of the sale of lots, the
developer offered membership in a to-be-constructed development. As the court noted, "[o]ne
of the selling points for the lots was the representation that with each lot the purchaser would
receive the right to membership in a 'Rod and Reel Club' which club would own and operate
the clubhouse and grounds, and which would maintain fish in the lakes, and would carry on the
usual activities of a country club." Id. at 959. Again, according to the court, "[fjrom the
inception of the subdivision, apparently there was great emphasis placed on the value of the area
as a playground spot, and the fact that the property owners would be able to use the lakes,
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clubhouse, the playgrounds and the picnic grounds, through their membership in the Rod and
Reel Club and by virtue of their ownership of the lots." Id. at 959, 960.
The development fell on hard times and was ultimately acquired from a security holder.
The ultimate title holder sought to exclude the members from use of and access to the club. The
court ruled that the property owners held an easement to the use of the grounds, clubhouse, and
lakes, i.e., to the Rod and Reel Club, that survived the foreclosure of security interests.
Similarly, Warburton's rights to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, like the shooting
privileges in Maw, the hunting and fishing memberships in Davis, and the recreational
memberships in Bradley, constitute an easement in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course. This is
specifically so because as in Maw, Davis and Bradley, Warburton's rights arose out of a real
estate transaction that was intended to benefit the servient estate, i.e., the golf course.
II. WARBURTON'S LRA FULLY COMPLIES WITH THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Rather than directly addressing the question of whether Warburton's LRA creates an
interest in land, defendants instead assert the statute of frauds as a defense. In other words,
defendants assert that even if an interest in land was intended, it was not conveyed properly and
therefore is not protected. Defendants rely entirely upon the codified statute of frauds and the
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1970 case of Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970), for their defense.2'
Defendants' arguments must fail for the following reasons:
A.

The Intent of Warburton's LRA was to Create an Easement.

As this Court recognized in Wasatch Mines, the intent of the parties is determinative as to
whether an agreement creates an easement or other interest in land. In Wycoffv. Barton, 646
P.2d 756 (Utah 1982), this Court further held that a conveyance of an easement must be
construed against the grantor, and "the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of
the parties, and the object to be obtained are also to be considered." Id. at 758. The Court also
stated that where there is some doubt as to the meaning of the conveyance, "the court may also
look to the practical construction placed upon the instrument by the parties."-7 Id.
11

In Utah, the statute of frauds is codified in Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-1 (1953):
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law,
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same . . . .
Wasatch Mines addressed the question of whether an agreement to allow the removal of soil
constituted a profit a prendre, i.e., the transfer of an interest in land. In Wasatch Mines,
the Court acknowledged that a transfer of an interest in land does not have to be by deed,
but may also be by other forms of writing. The Court then analyzed the elements of such
a writing, including the intent to create an interest in land and a description of the land to
which the easement applies.

-7

Defendants attempt to avoid the intent of the parties by stating that the testimony of the
plaintiffs and The Jeremy Ltd. is irrelevant to the issue of what type of interest was granted
to plaintiffs. Defendants instead seek to impose their own view of the intent of the parties
without support of any statement of the parties to the LRAs themselves. The intent of the
parties as expressed in the depositions of plaintiff and others and the affidavit of Tom
Bagley as to the interests conveyed in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course are determinative on
this issue.
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It is in this area of intent that the differences between Warburton's LRA and the sample
LRA are most poignant. In this regard it should be noted that the lower court ruled that the
sample LRA did create an easement in gross. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the
Court does not find that the sample LRA created an easement in gross, there can be little doubt
that Warburton's LRA did. (The Court is directed to Warburton's LRA that is attached hereto
as Exhibit A.)
Where the sample LRA used the word "lifetime" to describe the membership, Warburton's
LRA inserts the word "perpetual." More significantly, Warburton's LRA inserts the following
language that does not appear in the sample LRA:
The obligations and provisions to the members of the club shall be binding upon any other
owners, successors or assigns of the club.
The parties to the Warburton LRA clearly intended to create a perpetual interest in the golf
course. Warburton was granted a perpetual, irrevocable, transferable right to use the Jeremy
Ranch Golf Course.

In consideration of these permanent rights, Warburton contributed

substantial funds which were used to construct the golf course on which he was granted golfing
privileges. Warburton did not pay this significant consideration with the intention of only
obtaining some form of license which was transitory, temporary, or revocable at will to use a
golf course that was not yet constructed.
Furthermore, it is significant that the affidavit of Gerald Bagley on behalf of The Jeremy
Ltd. clarifies the intent that plaintiffs' rights are easements. According to Mr. Bagley, the sole
general partner of The Jeremy Ltd.:
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Purchasers under the LRAs were told by myself and authorized sales personnel that
the rights granted by the Jeremy, Ltd. under the LRAs were perpetual rights to use
the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, clubhouse and facilities without regard to who or what
entity owned the property.
(Aff. G. Bagley, f 8, R. 801, 802). Both the language of Warburton's LRA and the grantor of
Warburton's LRA could not be more clear. Warburton was granted a perpetual right, i.e., an
easement in gross, to access and use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course.
B.

The Jeremy Ranch Golf Course Which is the Subject of Warburton's Easement
is Sufficiently Described in Warburton's LRA.
Defendants argue that Warburton's LRA does not sufficiently describe the property

subject to the easement, and thus does not create an easement. This argument is meritless.
Warburton's LRA provides in part:
1. Reservation Agreement: For deposit received of $5,000.00 and $20,000.00
on or before May 1, 1981, on the total purchase price of FIFTY-THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($50,000.00), the DEVELOPER promises to reserve for the
PURCHASER one (1) lot in the proposed subdivision surrounding The Jeremy Ranch
Golf Course to be constructed on The Jeremy Ranch property located in Section 1,
2, and 3, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Summit
County, State of Utah.
It must be assumed that this legal description applied to the entirety of the Jeremy Ranch
property, a portion of which was intended to be developed into a golf course and related
facilities. Obviously, this description does not precisely describe the golf course, but it does
describe the property upon which the golf course would be built.
In Utah, it is not necessary that property be described by metes and bounds, but only
that it cannot be confused with other property. In the Matter of the Estate of Louis J. Bonny,
600 P.2d 548 (Utah 1979). Bonny involved the purported conveyance of an interest in land.
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No deed was ever given, but three receipts existed with references to "11 acres of property at
Alpine." Those challenging the conveyance contended that the receipt did not comply with the
statute of frauds. The Bonny Court first noted that the three receipts could be taken together to
constitute the required "writing." With respect to the property description, the Court set forth
the following test:
All parties agree that decedent had 11.6 acres at Alpine. Though the property is not
described by metes and bounds or with reference to monuments, it is sufficient if the
memorandum identifies the property with such particularity that it cannot be confused
with, or claimed to apply to any other property. In such a case, the exact description
may be shown by parol evidence.
Id. at pp. 550, 551.
As in Bonny, all parties must agree that there is only one golf course on the described
Jeremy Ranch property. There can be no argument that the "Jeremy Ranch Golf Course" can
be confused with any other property. Warburton's LRA clearly meets the property description
test. The intent of Warburton's LRA to create an easement is also clearly delineated. Thus,
his LRA fully complies with the statute of frauds.
III. ANY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WHICH THE LOWER COURT MAY HAVE
CONSIDERED WAS PROPER TO RESOLVE ANY AMBIGUITY IN THE LRA.
Defendants contend that the lower court should not have ruled as it did because of certain
extrinsic evidence which the court may have considered in ruling that the sample LRA language
created easements. Defendants' current argument contradicts the position they have previously
taken in this case. Defendants asserted the ambiguity of missing terms in the LRA language as
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a basis for disputing the easement claim.-7 Defendants now contend, however, that the LRA
is not ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence should not have been considered.
Parol or extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the contractual intent of the parties to
an ambiguous agreement. Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 132 (Utah App. 1991). Because the
lower court held that the language in the LRA was "somewhat ambiguous," any extrinsic
evidence which the lower court may have considered was proper in view of the "many
questions" which defendants claim were raised by the language of the LRA.
Defendants place unwarranted reliance on Martinez v. Martinez, 604 P.2d 366, 368 (N.M.
1979), to support their argument. In Martinez, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
intent of the parties regarding an easement is determined from all the attendant circumstances
and that the behavior of the parties may fill in missing details of the agreement creating an
easement. Utah's Supreme Court has similarly held that the intent of the parties must be
considered in determining the extent of the easement and the agreement creating it must be
construed against the property owner. Wycoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1982).
-;

Defendants raised the ambiguity and questions unanswered in the LRA as a basis to attack
the easement claim:
For example: Can the course be modified ? Can it be closed ? What
constitutes family ? Can course play be regulated ? Can course play be
interrupted for tournaments ? What if no lot is ever purchased ?
These questions and many others have no answer in the language of
the Lot Reservation Agreements.
(Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p.
25)
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Defendants attempt to avoid discussing the intent of the parties by stating that the testimony
of the Bagleys is irrelevant to the issue of what type of interest was granted to plaintiffs.
Defendants instead seek to impose their own view of the intent of the parties without support of
any statement of the parties to Warburton's LRA. The intent of the parties as expressed in the
affidavits of Gerald Bagley and Tom Bagley as to the interests conveyed in the Jeremy Ranch
Golf Course are determinative on this issue. No evidence has been offered, and none exists,
which would contradict the clear intent of the parties to create an easement.
IV. WARBURTON ALSO HOLDS AN EQUITABLE EASEMENT.
Even assuming that Warburton's LRA is somehow deficient under the statute of frauds,
Warburton nonetheless holds an equitable easement. Utah's Supreme Court has recognized that
an equitable easement can be created orally when coupled with expenditures made in permanent
improvements to the land. See Wells v. Marcus, 480 P.2d 129 (Utah 1971). Wells involved a
dispute over the use of culinary water from a common source. The parties had worked together
in constructing a pipeline to convey water from this common source. This pipeline traversed
plaintiffs land.

After the dispute arose, the question became whether defendant held an

easement or merely a license. The Court initially acknowledged that there was no writing
creating an easement and the claimed easement would normally be defeated by the statute of
frauds. However, the Court recognized an exception based upon the equitable doctrine of part
performance:
Under the equitable doctrine of part performance, a verbal agreement for an easement
has been enforced by some courts. This doctrine applies to all cases in which a court
of equity would entertain a suit for specific performance if the alleged contract had
s:\alr\34850
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been in writing. * * * If expenditures be made in permanent improvements inuring
to the benefit of a licensor under an express oral license given by him, then such
license becomes irrevocable, and, if it relates to the use or occupation of real estate,
it becomes an easement.
Id. at 130.
Although the Wells court did not find an equitable easement, their conclusion was based
upon the absence of even an oral agreement. In the instant case an oral agreement clearly exists.
Dr. Bagley represented to Warburton that upon payment of $25,000, which was to be used to
build the golf course, Warburton would have the perpetual right to use the facility and that this
right would run with the land.

This representation is reflected in Warburton's LRA.

Warburton, therefore, has an equitable easement.
In Bradley v. Frazier Park Playgrounds, 242 P.2d 958 (Cal. App. 1952), as previously
mentioned, a case very similar to the instant one, Bradley and others sued Frazier Park to
establish their right to use certain recreational facilities for hunting and fishing. These facilities
were included within the real estate development in which plaintiffs had bought lots relying upon
a salesman's representation that they would have permanent use of the facilities without
restriction. A subsequent owner of the development excluded plaintiffs' use of the facilities.
The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to an equitable easement to use such facilities, even
though no such right of use or easement had been granted by written conveyance, and that
defendant was bound by this easement:
The evidence fully supports the court's finding that it was the intention of the
subdivider and of its sales agents to create and set aside a portion of the subdivision
as a 'commons' or playgrounds, for the specified use and benefit of the purchasers of
lots, in perpetuity. The subdivision map so indicates. The price obtained for the lots
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clearly indicates such rights were considered a portion of the price paid. Appellant
Holland and his predecessors in interest apparently had knowledge of these facts or,
at least, evidence of these claimed rights and privileges was, as found by the court,
so notorious and of such common knowledge as to impart notice of them.
Id. at p. 958.
Like the plaintiffs in Bradley, Warburton bought a lot in Jeremy Ranch relying upon the
representation that he would have the perpetual right to use the golf course and related facilities.
Thus, under the doctrine of equitable easement, Warburton holds an easement in the Jeremy
Ranch Golf Club as a matter of law.
V. WARBURTON'S EASEMENT AND RIGHTS THEREUNDER ARE CONSISTENT
WITH OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY BY THE JEREMY LTD. AND ITS
SUCCESSORS IN INTERESTS.
Defendants place undue and irrelevant emphasis on the facts that the Jeremy Ranch Golf
Club is a "proprietary club" and not an "equity club," and that The Jeremy Ltd. and not
plaintiffs were the "owners" of the Golf Course. Defendants fail to make a point with these
assertions. All these facts, assuming them to be true, are entirely consistent with the easement
claimed by plaintiffs in the Golf Course property. After all, an easement is not the same as an
interest in fee simple.-7
An easement is an interest in property which, though
distinct from an ownership interest in the land itself, nevertheless confers upon the
holder of the easement an enforceable right to use property of another for specific
purposes.
5 !

-

Chournos v. D 'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982); Lindhorst v. Wright, 616 P.2d 450, 454
(Okl. App. 1980) (an easement does not vest title, but only a limited right to use property
of another); Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 14 Utah 2d 364, 384 P.2d 590 (1963) (easement is only
privilege of limited use and does not convey ownership).
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Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 P.2d 384, 387 (Colo. 1985) (emphasis added); see also
Kennedy v. Bond, 460 P.2d 809 (N.M. 1969); Boyd v. McDonald, 408 P.2d 717, 720 (Nev.
1965) (easement distinct from ownership). It is clear, therefore, that Warburton's golfing
privileges and easement are consistent with ownership of the Golf Course property by The
Jeremy Ltd. and any of its successors in interest.
The fact that Warburton's LRA makes reference to "memberships" in no respect limits the
rights Warburton obtained. The "memberships" clearly represent the golfing privileges and
rights to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course Property acquired by payment of substantial
consideration. Such rights are expressly perpetual, irrevocable and fully transferable. These
rights are not analogous to mere membership of an association or health club. They are
significant interests in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course property which, just as the shooting
privileges at the gun club in Maw, supra, constitute easements in the property that are expressly
binding upon VBF, a successor to The Jeremy Ltd.'s interest.
VI. VBF HAD SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF WARBURTON'S INTEREST PRIOR TO THE
CLOSING TO CREATE A PRIORITY AND, THEREFORE, SUCH INTEREST IS
NOT AFFECTED BY THE FORECLOSURE SALE.
Warburton's right to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course has priority over all rights and
claims of VBF and its successors to the property, under the loans, trust deeds, Security
Agreements, or otherwise. Warburton's easement in the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course was created
prior to the original VBF loan and Trust Deed recorded December 6, 1982. Prior to the loan,
VBF had actual, constructive or inquiry notice of the rights granted to Warburton to use the
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Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, clubhouse and facilities. In fact, VBF took a security interest in,
and an assignment of, the very LRA which granted Warburton membership rights.
Defendants argue that the lower court erred in determining that VBF had notice of
Warburton's LRA because there remain issues of fact. The only disputed question is whether
the actual LRAs, including Warburton's, were delivered to VBF prior to the closing. VBF
contends that it had only seen the sample LRA and a list of all those who held LRA, including
Warburton. There is no dispute as to whether VBF's agent, Richards Woodbury, had all the
LRAs prior to closing: he did. Notice to an agent, as a matter of law, constitutes notice to the
principal. Johnson Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 279, 358
P.2d 337 (1961); Time Finance Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., Inc., 23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d
873 (1969).
Even assuming that VBF did not have Warburton's LRA, and that it is not bound by the
actual notice to its agent, VBF is nonetheless precluded from raising the notice issue as a
defense. It is well established that a subsequent purchaser is deemed to have actual notice when
such party has sufficient information to put it on inquiry notice of the claimed interest.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-6 (1986), conveyances of real
property are binding upon persons with "actual notice," even though not
properly acknowledged and recorded. The Utah Supreme Court has held
that "actual notice" will be imputed "if a party dealing with the land had
information of facts which would put a prudent man upon inquiry and
which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the
title.
Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d 820, 821 (Utah App. 1987); Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310
(Utah 1983); Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890).
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In Salt Lake v. Garfield & Western Railway Co., 291 P.2d 883 (Utah 1955), plaintiffs'
predecessor had obtained a decree in condemnation to increase the width of a right-of-way. A
deed to defendants did not specifically reference this decree, although it was visually apparent
that plaintiffs were using the subject property. Defendants contended that the recitation in their
deeds could not reasonably charge the defendants with constructive notice of the decree in
condemnation so as to defeat the defendants' claim that they were purchasers in good faith
without notice. The Court held that defendants had sufficient information to put a reasonably
prudent person on notice and to charge him with the duty to inquire further to ascertain what the
facts were. The Court adopted the following standard:
Means of knowledge and knowledge itself, are in legal effect, the same thing
where there is enough to put a party on inquiry. Knowledge which one has or ought
to have under the circumstances is imputed to him. When a party has information
or knowledge of certain extraneous facts which of themselves do not amount to, nor
tend to show, an actual notice, but which are sufficient to put a reasonably prudent
man upon an inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, claim, or right, and the
circumstances are such that the inquiry, if made and followed up with reasonable
care and diligence, would lead to the discovery of the truth, to a knowledge of the
interest, claim, or right which really exists, then the party is absolutely charged
with a constructive notice of such interest, claim, or right. In other words, whatever
fairly puts a person on inquiry is sufficient notice where the means of knowledge are
at hand; and if he omits to inquire, he is then chargeable with all the facts which, by
a proper inquiry, he might have ascertained. A person has no right to shut his eyes
or his ears to avoid information, and then say that he had no notice; he does
wrong not to heed the 'signs and signals' seen by him. It will not do to remain
wilfully ignorant of a thing readily ascertainable, and it is no excuse for failure to
make an inquiry, that if made, it might have failed to develop the truth.
Id. at 885, 886 (emphasis in bold added).
In High v. Davis, cited previously at p. 13, supra, the Oregon Supreme Court was dealing
with hunting and fishing rights sold in conjunction with the sale of real estate.
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These

"memberships" were sold prior to the exercise of security rights in the real property. In addition
to whether interest in land was conveyed (see Point I), the question was whether the mortgagee
had sufficient notice of the memberships to deprive it of priority. The mortgagee, prior to
closing, had actual notice of founders' memberships in an exclusive hunting and fishing club on
the involved property. The court held that the mortgagee had sufficient notice to give rise to
a duty of inquiry, and that the failure to so inquire defeated any priority of a security interest
over the members' rights.
VBF certainly had, at the very least, this type of "inquiry notice" of Warburton's perpetual
right to use the golf course by virtue of its dealings and transactions prior to the loan closing,
including receipt of a sample of the LRAs which created such rights. VBF clearly knew, prior
to the loans, that the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course involved memberships granting rights to use
the golf course. VBF even discussed such memberships with The Jeremy Ltd. representatives.
All the homeowners' golf memberships/easements, including Warburton's, were granted by The
Jeremy Ltd. prior to the loan of VBF. VBF took a security interest and assignment of all the
LRAs, the very documents which created and granted the memberships/easements. VBF may
not now shut its eyes to avoid information which was readily ascertainable prior to making the
loan.
The Assignment of LRAs which VBF took as security for its loans included a standard
LRA form. The attached form clearly granted the above described rights to use the golf course
and facilities. Paragraph 2 of the LRA form contained the following provision:
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It is understood that a Lifetime Family Membership in the Jeremy Ranch
Golf and Country Club is included with the purchase of a lot on the Jeremy
Ranch. There are no monthly dues, nor can any dues ever be assessed.
This Membership is transferable. It may be sold without a transfer fee. It
is not assessable.
The Assignment of LRAs also contained a list of 169 LRA holders, including Warburton,
representing 208 lots and memberships. The Jeremy Ltd. furnished all the original LRAs to
Richards Woodbury and in September of 1982, three months prior to the loan, VBF's agent
Richards Woodbury conducted a survey of these agreements.
There exist no genuine issues of material fact. Warburton's rights and interests in the
Jeremy Ranch Golf Course, clubhouse and facilities, therefore, are effective and enforceable
against VBF with actual, inquiry, and constructive notice of such interests as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Warburton's rights to use the Jeremy Ranch Golf Course and Clubhouse facilities is an
affirmative easement and is enforceable against VBF and its successors in the Jeremy Ranch Golf
Course property. VBF had actual notice of such rights and interests in the LRAs prior to
making the loans on the Jeremy Ranch property. Therefore, Warburton's membership rights
have priority over the encumbrances of VBF and the Lenders and are unaffected by any
foreclosure thereof.
It is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court's ruling on summary judgment be
affirmed.
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DATED this 1st day of June, 1994.

^Anthony L. R^^ton
FABIAN &€LENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Appellee, Warburton
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 1st day of June, 1994,1 caused to be hand delivered true
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of the Appellee, to:
John P. Ashton, Esq.
Thomas J. Erbin, Esq.
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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LOT HKSKHVATION AGKKEMKNT

IQ-

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this
otO.HJjtA.-'UL

day

3 98/, by and between THE JEREMY LTD., A LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP, hereinafter called "DEVELOPER", and
^iJyu.lXh-n^

/l^U^tC^g ^'r-'
CONSIDERATION

^/C

'S^±^^L^2Li—

hereinafter called "PURCHASER";

of the covenants herein contained, it

is mutually agreed between the parties hereto as follows:
7J C/-'-r>c ^

C

**

Reservation Agreement:

For deposit received of

TWENTY-riVE TI10U0AND DOLLAng-(-$2S , 000 . 00 )? on the total purchase
price of FI FIT-THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50,000-00), the DEVELOPER
promises to reserve for the PURCHASER one (1) lot in the proposed
subdivision surrounding The Jeremy Ranch Golf Course to be constructed on The Jeremy Ranch property located in Section 1, 2,
and 3, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
Summit County, State of Utah.

The PURCHASER shall have the right

to select any lot in the proposed subdivision which has not been
previously sold or committed to other parties at the time the
PURCHASER'S rights under this Reservation Agreement are exercised.
If, for any reason, PURCHASER decides to withdraw the reservation
deposit, it will be refunded upon demand plus 7% (seven

percent)

interest per annum prorated for the number of days it has been
held by the DEVELOPER, but such demand may not be made until the
deposit has been held by the DEVELOPER for at least three years. 1^#^
^perpetual
VOf^
2.
Club Membership.
I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t a LifiliTnoFamily Membership in The .Jeremy Ranch Golf and Country C l u b * i s
•including a l l Jeremy Ranch Club f a c i l i t i e s
i n c l u d e d with t h e purchase of a l o t on The Jeremy Ranch.
are no monthly d u e s , nor can any dues e v e r be a s s e s s e d .

There
This

membership i s t r a n s f e r a b l e .
It may be s o l d w i t h o u t a t r a n s f e
fee.
I t i s not a s s e s s a b l e . TTie obligations and provisions to the members of
trie club shall be binding upon any other owners, successors or assigns of the club.
3.

Term. T h i s R e s e r v a t i o n Agreement s h a l l extend t o

and e x p i r e at t h e time of t h e s a l e or commitment t o o t h e r

parties

o f t h e l a s t l o t i n t h e proposed s u b d i v i s i o n r e f e r r e d t o above.

If

PURCHASER has not e x e r c i s e d h i s r i g h t s under t h i s agreement p r i o r
t o t h a t t i m e , t h e l o t w i l l be f o r f e i t e d ,

and t h e DEVELOPER s h a l l

keep t h e $25,000 d e p o s i t , and i t s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d t o be payment

001171

i n f u l l for t h e aforementioned Jeremy Golf Club L i f e t i m e Membership,
rvawoiorvor c^all aive 30 dav notice to purchaser as time to make his lot selection.

.„..,„„ Ai:r.*<:mont shall bo csrreJs.J'l by writlon miLiiu lo
DKVKLOPER AT 735G Wasatch Doulovard, S:i 1 L I.:il;i! i'ity, 111 ah, on
or prior to the expiration of the term hereof.

Ti Lit! to U m

lot may not be taken prior to the time 1 he lot to he sulci*.led
has been properly platted and registered, all required approvalshave been obtained

from governmental agencies having juris-

diction over the property and the lot may be legally sulci. The!
balance of the purchase price shall be paid at closing, which
shall be within thirty, (30) days from the date upon which the
agreement is exercised, at which time all general property taxes
shall be prorated.

At closing, the DEVELOPER shall, at its

expense, provide to PURCHASER, a policy of title insurance subject only to standard and recorded or platted casements, restrictions, and reservations.

Final conveyance shall be made by

Warranty Deed conveying title free

and clear of all liens and

encumbrances except those which are shown as exceptions in the
title policy.
5.

This Agreement shall not be assigned by the PURCHASER

to any other party and the rights granted hereunder are not transi t ~k ^C w*v^ ; >^^L _04tU*i
ferable without the prior written consent of DEVEIOPER^ with the
exception of those rights in paragraph 2 above.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed Lhe I r
names or caused the names of their duly authorized agents to be
signed hereunder.
DEVELOPER:
THE JEREMY LTD., A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
* * e r t L. Warburtorr M.D.
°/AL
u a n d o n R -Avenue
"^burton
1484 Harvard
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
PURCHASER:

*

A

^

.&<

Purchaser's number i s
and i t i s understood
x3 t h i s follows
folic
185, p r i o r reservation numbers
for phases 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 .
By:
•If

$ 2 5 , 0 0 0 i s p a i d by

will receive

{*£

\

I?JM,

•PURCHASER"

Si
5000 s h a r e s o ff Sunny
H i l l Mines r e g i s t e r e d

stock.

Tab 2

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MAX GREENHALGH, et al..

UKD£K

Ut

FAKT1AL.

.

' \e //^'n"

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 10005

Plaintiffs,
vs.

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL
VIRGINIA BEACH FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATE, a foreign
corporation; ATLANTIC PERMANENT
FEDERAL, a foreign corporation;
JEFFERSON SAVINGS & LOAN, a
foreign corporation; THE JEREMY,
LTD, a Utah limited partnership;
JEREMY SERVICE CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; ASSOCIATED
TITLE COMPANY, INC., a Utah
corporation,

NO.

„+m

FILED

AUG 2 3 1991
Clerk 9$ Summit Ceuirty «

w
teptftyCto

Defendants.
The

Motion

of plaintffs'

defendants'

Cross-Motion

defendants7

Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment,

for Partial

Summary

Judgment,

to Strike Affidavit of Gerald H. Bagley came

on regularly before the above entitled Court on May 6,
3:00

p.m., the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding.

were represented by Wilford A.
Fitts,
The

and

Beesley,

1991,

at

Plaintiffs'

Esq. and Stanford P.

Esq. Defendants were represented by George A. Hunt, Esq.

Court,

submitted

having

considered

and arguments

the memoranda

and

affidavits

of counsel, and being fully advised in

the premises, and in accordance

with

the Court's

Memorandum

GREENHALGH V VIRGINIA BEACH

PAGE 2

ORDER

Decision of July 11, 1991, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

The court denies

Affidavit

defendants' Motion

to

Strike

the

of Gerald H. Bagley in its entirety, but strikes those

portions of the Affidavit indicated as follows:
a.

The

last

except that portion which

sentence
refers

of

to

paragraph 2 is stricken

discussions

relating

the

subject matter stated herein.
b.

The

testimony

relating

to

the

corporate

structure of defendants is stricken.
c.

Paragraph 7 of the Affidavit is stricken.

d.

The

portions of paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 stating

that Richards-Woodbury was an agent

of

Virginia

Beach

Federal

Savings and Loan are stricken.
e.
16

and

24

stricken.

The portions of the first sentence of

referring

Those

to

portions

the

state

referring

paragraphs

of mind of defendants are
to

discussions

involving

affiant are not stricken.
2.
granted.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Defendants' Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment

is

Summary Judgment is

denied.
Plaintiffs7

3.
described

as

facilities.

the

hold

Jeremy

easements in gross in the property

Ranch

Golf

Course

and

Clubhouse
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4.
purchaser

The easements
(founder
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in

member)

gross
and

include

the

club

house

Ranch

Golf

or

users

with

the

Course

exception

plaintiffs as Founder Members are not required to pay green

fees, monthly dues for the right to use the course and
and

the

facilities subject to the same reasonable rules

and regulations as other members
that

of

the purchasers family, for the

lifetime of the purchaser, to use the Jeremy
and

right

are

not

Members rights

subject
are

to

periodic assessments.

transferrable

and

clubhouse

These Founding

irrevocable

during

the

lifetime of the founding member.
5.
without

Plaintiffs
unreasonable

are

entitled

to

interference

exercise

from

defendants,

successors and assigns.
DATED this c^>/ c^ day of August, 1991.

FRANK G. NOI
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

B00K.UPAGF21O

said

00084,

rights
their
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I
the

hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of

foregoing

Order

of

Partial

Summary

prepaid, to the following, this c^x^<

Judgment,

day of August, 1991:

Wilford A. Beesley
Stanford P. Pitts
BEESLEY, FAIRCLOUGH, CANNON & FITTS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
300 Deseret Book Building
4 0 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
George A. Hung
Kurt M. Frankenburg
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant
P. 0. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678

:(C>£^K

?X^*~T~*

/

postage

Tab 3

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Max Greenhalgh, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO: 10005

vs.
Virginia Beach Federal Savings & Loan
Association; Jeremy Service Corp., et al.,
Defendants.

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

Now before the Court are numerous outstanding motions. The Court has reviewed
memos submitted in connection with said motions, has heard oral argument, has ruled from the
bench on certain of the motions, and has also reviewed the proposed order regarding the Court's
bench ruling together with the objections thereto and now consolidates all of it's rulings into this
one order:
1.

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
APPLICATION OF AUGUST 22. 1991 ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO SPECIFIC PLAINTIFFS.
It has been stipulated by the parties that the Court's ruling of August 22, 1992

should apply to those plaintiffs listed in paragraph 9 of plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of
its Motion, constituting plaintiffs' numbered 1 through 22, and the Court so rules. Defendants
however suggest an exception to plaintiff number 19, "Paul Taylor", on the grounds that his
LRA was non-transfen-able. It appears clear from a reading of Mr. Taylor's LRA that it is
indeed transfenable, and therefore includes Mr. Taylor in the first group of 22 for which the
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Eourt grants summary judgment. Defendants also suggest an exception for plaintiff number 3
Elmer Burger on the basis that said plaintiff signed a release in 1987 which purported to
completely resolve all claims between the parties. The Court agrees and finds that there are fact
issues regarding plaintiff number 3 Elmer Burger.
As to the second set of plaintiffs listed in paragraph 10 of plaintiffs' Memorandum
defendants have raised the defense of lack of consideration. The Court has reviewed all of the
matters submitted in connection with this argument, particularly the affidavits of Mr. William
Blair and Mr. Al Kofoed, together with the agreements which recite the receipt of consideration
and the Court is of the opinion that the record establishes the payment of consideration for said
plaintiffs and that defendants have failed to establish any facts which create a genuine issue of
fact as to consideration. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion as to those plaintiffs listed
in paragraph 10 of plaintiffs's memo.
Defendants have also raised the issue of the "non-transferabilityM of memberships as to
plaintiffs 23, 42 and 43, and claimed that those memberships which are not transferable do not
come within the Court's ruling of August 22, 1991. The Court is of the opinion that an
easement in gross may indeed be non-transferrable. Particularly where an easement is of a
personal nature as is somewhat the case here, a non-transferable clause would not defeat the
easement. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs number 31 and 36 do not have properly signed
LRA's. It appears to the Court however that said LRA's have been signed and there has been
no facts developed on this record to show that the signatures were not authorized by the
partnership. Lastly, as to this second group of plaintiffs defendants claim that plaintiffs 29, 46
and 47 signed membership disclosure statements providing that the memberships were linked to
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the ownership of the golf course by the Jeremy Ltd.. The Court feels that this raises a fact issue
as to whether or not their memberships were limited by these disclosure statements and as to
these plaintiffs will deny the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The next group of plaintiffs, listed in paragraph 14 of plaintiffs' memo received a lot in
lieu of a cash refund. Defendants argue that these plaintiffs lost their membership when they
received the lot in lieu of a refund. While Mr. Blair's affidavit seems to suggest otherwise,
nevertheless there are some statements made by Mr. Blair in other documents which could be
viewed as contradicting the affidavits and therefore the Court feels that there is a fact issue as
to these plaintiffs and will therefore deny the Motion.
2.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

The Court has reviewed the memos filed in connection with the Motion for
Reconsideration. It appears that no new evidence has been submitted to the Court and that this
is primarily a re-argument of the legal principals involved, with the possible exception of the
new issue raised by defendants, that being the argument that the contracts are void for lack of
mutuality. As to the issue of the lack of mutuality the Court notes that in the LRA's in this case
the sole consideration for the contract was not the mutual promises of the parties. Under the
terms of the LRA other consideration was acknowledged including the $5,000.00 payment.
In it's Motion to Reconsider the defendants also raised the issue of lack of notice on the
part of the defendants.

Defendants admit that VBF received a sample LRA and a list of

purchasers prior to the loan closing. But they claim that it was not explained to them that the
LRA constituted an easement. The Court is of the opinion that sufficient notice occurred when
the sample LRA and list of purchasers was supplied to the defendants.
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Accordingly, defendants' Motion to Reconsider is denied.
3.

MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
PERPETUAL NATURE OF FOUNDER MEMBERSHIP RIGHTS AND
EASEMENTS.
The Court is of the opinion that the language in the Lot Reservation Agreement

regarding "life time family memberships" which are "transferrable" is ambiguous. The Court
finds that the evidence is uncontroverted that the intent of the parties to these agreements in
those circumstances was that the rights to use the golf course are peipetual. However, those
memberships which are "life time" memberships and "non-transferrable" do not present an
ambiguity.

While the non-transferrable language does not defeat the basic instrument,

nevertheless it helps to define the duration of the easement and the Court is of the opinion that
a life time non-transferrable membership is not transferrable but is limited by the life time of
the grantee. Those LRA's which contain "life time" and also "perpetual" language are also in
the opinion of the Court ambiguous. The Court finds as to these that the entire record is
uncontroverted that the intent of the parties was that those memberships would be peipetual.
4.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ATTQKNHEV PTIENT
DOCUMENTS.
As to defendants' Motion in Limine the Court is of the opinion that a former

employee or officer of a corporation cannot waive the attorney client privilege for the
corporation. The defendants point to the case of Gold Standard v. American Resources. 805
P2d 164 (Utah 1990). While that case did not involve the attorney client privilege but rather
the work product doctrine, nevertheless, the Court agrees with defendants that these attorney
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client communication should be protected. The Court is of the opinion that the intent of the
holder of the privUege must be given substantial effect. The Court is of the opinion that much
mischief could occur as a result of a rule which allows an adversary to avoid the attorney client
privilege if he is able to obtain documents from his opponent by stealth, deceit or some other
subterfuge. The Court does not in any way suggest that is what occurred in this case but merely
uses that to underscore it's opinion that the intent of the parties while perhaps not controlling
in every case must be given substantial consideration.
Accordingly, defendants1 Motion in Limine is granted.
5.

COUNT I ALTER EGO AND COUNT VI LENDER UABIUTY.
As to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and VI plaintiffs

state that they are making claims only for the conduct of the Jeremy Service Corporation
subsequent to the time that it was substituted as general partner for Jeremy Ltd.. With that
understanding the Court is of the opinion that there are fact issues to be resolved by the trier of
fact regarding claims of alter ego in Count I and the claims contained in Count VI.
6.

COUNT Vn FIDUCIARY DUTY AND COUNT VII THIRD PARTY
BENEFICIARY CLAIMS.
The Court is of the opinion that this record fails to establish any basis for a claim

by these plaintiffs against the defendants on the basis of a fiduciary duty owed by defendants to
plaintiffs or on the basis of plaintiffs being third party beneficiaries to contracts entered into by
defendants. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants' Motion as to these counts.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this f\2>

day of January, 1993

FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Tab 4

584 P.2d 725
(Cite as: 283 Or. 315, 584 P.2d 725)
Wallace HIGH, Richard Atchison, Charles L.
Milbrandt and Robert Lovell,
Appellants,
v,
Luther DAVIS and Helen E. Davis, husband and
wife, Skyline Enterprises, Inc.,
Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., and Cascade
Aviation, Inc., Respondents.
The LOMAS & NETTLETON COMPANY, a
Connecticut Corporation, Respondent,
v.
SKYLINE ENTERPRISES, INC., an Oregon
Corporation, et al., Defendants,
Wallace E. High, Richard G. Atchison, Charles
L. Milbrandt, Robert S. Lovell,
Floyd Thomas Morrell, James McFarland and
Deane Stearns, Appellants.
TC 3636, TC 3630; SCP-2486.
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
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interests of claimants.
Case remanded for modification of foreclosure
decree to provide that, except for one claimant who
had quitclaimed, claimants had interests superior to
that of mortgagee.
Lent, J., filed a specially concurring opinion.
[1] HUSBAND AND WIFE <®=> 17
205kl7
It was not necessary that wife of fee simple owner of
property join in land sale contract.
[2] CONTRACTS <§=> 175(1)
95kl75(l)
Under statute providing for conclusive presumption,
between parties, of truth of recitals in written
instrument, company and its successors in interest
were bound by recital, in membership agreements to
which company was party, that company owned
specified property. ORS 41.350(3).

Argued and Submitted June 5, 1978.
Decided Sept. 12, 1978.
A suit for declaratory judgment that claimants
were entitled to exclusive and perpetual hunting,
fishing and recreational rights on certain real
property and a suit by a mortgagee to foreclose
mortgages on such real property were consolidated
on appeal after the Circuit Court, Sherman County,
John A. Jelderks, J., held that the documents
purporting to convey the hunting and fishing
privileges did not adequately describe the property
or give claimants an interest in the property superior
to the mortgages. The Supreme Court, Tongue, J.,
upon de novo review of the evidence, held that: (1)
where it could be ascertained from description of
land in membership agreements and from evidence
other than writings and without necessity of
considering testimony by parties to the agreements
about their intentions or negotiations, that one
specific piece of property, described in a land sale
contract was the only property to which the
membership agreements could apply, purposes of
statute of frauds were satisfied and membership
agreements were specific enough to be enforceable,
and (2) the corporation by reason of a preliminary
title report from a title company was charged with
notice of facts that would have been discovered by
inquiry, and its security interest had no priority over
Copr.® West 1994 No claim

[3] ESTOPPEL <&=* 78(3)
156k78(3)
Company having been party to membership
agreements in which it was recited that company
owned specified property, company, later taking
interest by assignment, was estopped to deny its
power to convey interests in the land to the
membership subscribers, and company's successors
in interest were similarly estopped.
[3] ESTOPPEL <©=> 98(1)
156k98(l)
Company having been party to membership
agreements in which it was recited that company
owned specified property, company, later taking
interest by assignment, was estopped to deny its
power to convey interests in the land to the
membership subscribers, and company's successors
in interest were similarly estopped.
[4] CORPORATIONS <®=* 617(2)
101k617(2)
Where corporation, after reinstatement by
corporation commissioner, assigned vendee's
interest in land sale contract, such action was
ratification by corporation of acceptance on its
behalf of benefits of contract while corporation was
dissolved. ORS 57.630(2).
orig. U.S. Govt, works.

584 P.2d 725
(Cite as: 283 Or. 315, 584 P.2d 725)
[5] LICENSES <&* 43
238k43
Claimed right to hunting, fishing and recreational
rights, based upon membership agreements, could
be classified as "profit a prendre."~
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
[6] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <S=* 61
185k61
Element of participation in soil and its produce
distinguishes profit from easement; grant of "profit
a prendre" is grant of interest in land itself, and is
within statute of frauds. ORS 41.580.
[6] LICENSES <S^ 44(3)
238k44(3)
Element of participation in soil and its produce
distinguishes profit from easement; grant of "profit
a prendre" is grant of interest in land itself, and is
within statute of frauds. ORS 41.580.
[7] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <®^ 110(1)
185kll0(l)
Real issue, when sufficiency of description of land
in contract subject to statute of frauds is challenged,
is whether written description, in light of
ascertainable objective facts and without resort to
evidence of parties' intentions or oral discussions of
transaction, can be said with reasonable certainty to
apply only to one specific, identifiable piece of
property, in which case writing is sufficient under
statute of frauds although complete description of
property may have to be obtained from other
sources. ORS 41.580.
[8] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <&* 110(1)
185kll0(l)
If extrinsic evidence discloses that written
description can, with equal accuracy, apply to more
than one piece of property, writing will be held
insufficient, and parol evidence will not be
permitted to explain which of possible properties the
parties intended to describe. ORS 41.580.
[8] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <3=> 158(3)
185kl58(3)
If extrinsic evidence discloses that written
description can, with equal accuracy, apply to more
than one piece of property, writing will be held
insufficient, and parol evidence will not be
permitted to explain which of possible properties the
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parties intended to describe. ORS 41.580.
[9] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <§=> 110(1)
185kll0(l)
Where it appears from description of land itself,
without need to consider extrinsic evidence, that
description could apply to more than one piece of
property, and it is apparent from face of writing that
ambiguity cannot be cured without resort to parol
evidence of parties' intentions, writing is held
unenforceable under statute of frauds. ORS 41.580.
[10] FRAUDS, STATUTE OF <&* 110(1)
185kll0(l)
Where it could be ascertained from description of
land in membership agreements and from evidence
other than writings and without necessity of
considering testimony by parties to the agreements
about their intentions or negotiations that specific
piece of property, described in land sale contract,
was only property to which membership agreements
could apply, purposes of statute of frauds were
satisfied and membership agreements were specific
enough to be enforceable. ORS 41.580.
[11] DEEDS <®^ 60
120k60
To be effective, delivery of deed must be
unconditional or any conditions must be satisfied.
[12] EVIDENCE <S=> 420(1)
157k420(l)
Parol evidence is admissible to determine whether in
fact there has been valid delivery of deed, but parol
evidence is not admissible to show that deed which
has been executed and delivered is subject to a
condition not appearing on face of the deed. ORS
41.580.
[12] EVIDENCE <&= 431
157k431
Parol evidence is admissible to determine whether in
fact there has been valid delivery of deed, but parol
evidence is not admissible to show that deed which
has been executed and delivered is subject to a
condition not appearing on face of the deed. ORS
41.580.
[13] DEEDS <§=* 121
120kl21
Execution and delivery of quitclaim deed precluded
grantor from thereafter asserting rights under prior

Copr.® West 1994 No claim to orig. U.S. Govt, works.
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(Cite as: 283 Or. 315, 584 P.2d 725)
membership agreement, despite contention that deed
was executed and delivered to remove cloud on title
and on condition that it would be binding only if
grantee executed another agreement. ORS 41.580.
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See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.

[14] EVIDENCE <S^ 161.1
157kl61.1
Formerly 157kl61(l)
Oral testimony of writing and contents is normally
precluded by best evidence rule until party shows
that he could not produce original writing in
reasonable time by exercise of reasonable effort to
do so. ORS 41.640.

[16] MORTGAGES <&=> 154(2)
266kl54(2)
Notice that will deprive mortgagee of priority can be
either actual or constructive; "actual notice" is
direct knowledge of outstanding interest, while
"constructive notice" encompasses both notice
chargeable under recording statute and "inquiry
notice". ORS 93.710.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.

[14] EVIDENCE <S^ 181
157kl81
Oral testimony of writing and contents is normally
precluded by best evidence rule until party shows
that he could not produce original writing in
reasonable time by exercise of reasonable effort to
do so. ORS 41.640.

[17] MORTGAGES <©=> 154(4)
266kl54(4)
Mortgagee was not charged with record notice
where membership agreements granting rights to
hunt, fish, etc., on real property had not been
properly acknowledged before recordation. ORS
93.480.

[15] APPEAL AND ERROR <&* 1051(6)
30kl051(6)
Technically speaking, trial court should not have
admitted secondary evidence before determining
extent of diligence in searching for missing
document, but in view of evidence overwhelmingly
pointing to fact that missing agreement was identical
in form and content to all others involved in case,
any error in introduction of the secondary evidence
was harmless. ORS 41.640.

[18] MORTGAGES <®^ 154(2)
266kl54(2)
Corporation having received preliminary title report
from title company listing certain exceptions
including right, title and interest of holders of
memberships in development company, and
corporation having failed to make inquiry of
company or members asserting hunting and fishing
rights to determine extent of interest claimed,
corporation was charged with notice of facts that
would have been discovered by such inquiry, and its
security interest had no priority over interests of
such claimants. ORS 93.480.

[15] EVIDENCE <S=* 187
157kl87
Technically speaking, trial court should not have
admitted secondary evidence before determining
extent of diligence in searching for missing
document, but in view of evidence overwhelmingly
pointing to fact that missing agreement was identical
in form and content to all others involved in case,
any error in introduction of the secondary evidence
was harmless. ORS 41.640.
[16] MORTGAGES <&* 154(1)
266kl54(l)
Notice that will deprive mortgagee of priority can be
either actual or constructive; "actual notice" is
direct knowledge of outstanding interest, while
"constructive notice" encompasses both notice
chargeable under recording statute and "inquiry
notice". ORS 93.710.

[19] SECURITIES REGULATION <&* 300
349Bk300
Whether or not sale of membership agreements
constituted sales of securities, corporation which had
not been party to alleged illegal transaction had no
standing to claim invalidity of sales under statute.
ORS 59.250, Laws 1963, c. 244.
[20] EQUITY <&=> 65(1)
150k65(l)
Where there was no evidence of any intentional or
knowing violation of securities law, if there was
one, claimants of hunting and fishing rights did not
have "unclean hands" precluding relief to them, and,
where claimants were receiving only what they had
bargained and paid for, there was no unjust
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Summary of facts.

[21] MORTGAGES <@=> 17
266kl7
It is possible for mortgagee to be subrogated to
rights of prior lienor, but principles which permit
subrogation in such cases are equitable.
[22] MORTGAGES <&* 17
266kl7
Where mortgagee had notice of existence of
membership agreements creating hunting and fishing
rights and chose to proceed with mortgage
transaction without further investigation, there were
insufficient equities in its favor to entitle it to be
subrogated to rights of prior lienors whose liens had
been discharged out of mortgage proceeds, thus to
foreclose such hunting and fishing rights.
*316 **727 Brad Littlefield, of Goldsmith,
Siegel, Engel & Littlefield, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for appellants.
Gile R. Downes, of Jensen, DeFrancq, Holmes &
Schulte, Portland, argued the cause for respondents
The Lomas & Nettleton Co. and Lomas and
Nettleton Financial Corp. With him on the brief
was Ted Jensen, of Jensen, DeFrancq, Holmes &
Schulte, Portland.
TONGUE, Justice.
These two suits were consolidated on appeal
because of the identity of issues raised. In the first
case filed Wallace High and others (hereinafter
"claimants") sought a declaratory judgment that they
were entitled to exclusive and perpetual hunting,
fishing and recreational rights on certain real
property formerly owned by Luther Davis and that
their rights were superior to the rights of Lomas &
Nettleton. The second case was a suit by Lomas &
Nettleton to foreclose the two mortgages it had on
that real property.

These suits involve the assertion by the claimants
of hunting, fishing and recreational rights on
property known as the Luther Davis Ranch, a large
body of land located in Wasco, Sherman and
Gilliam Counties.
Davis was interested in
developing the property for an exclusive hunting and
fishing club. As part of his overall plan he sold the
property by land sale contract to Devsal, Inc., which
was to proceed with the sale of memberships in the
development. The contract also contemplated that
the "operation" would be transferred to the John
Day Recreational and Development Corporation
(JDRDC) which would promote and sell
memberships. It was also agreed that Davis would
execute documents granting the purchasers of
memberships the exclusive right to hunt, fish and
use the property in perpetuity and that these
documents would be separately recorded as
encumbrances on the property. Before JDRDC
actually sold the membership *318 agreements
various amendments were made to the land sale
contract to facilitate the development of the property
and the sale of memberships. Devsal later assigned
its interest in the land sale contract to JDRDC, but
this took place after the execution of all of the
membership agreements which are at issue in this
case. [FN 1]
FN1. See p. —. The chronology of these and
other relevant transactions, according to the
record, is as follows:

The trial court held that although Lomas &
Nettleton had some knowledge that there might be
claimed rights to hunting and fishing privileges, the
documents purporting to convey the interests did not
adequately **728 describe the property and did not
give claimants an interest in the property superior to
the mortgages. Upon de novo review of the
evidence we reverse the decree of the trial court.
Copr.® West 1994 No claim to orig. U.S. Govt, works.
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TRANSACTION
DATE

Land sale contract between Davis
netime prior to
Sept. 13, 1956.
oruary 16, 1965

ptember 7, 1965
ptember 14, 1965
ptember 30, 1965
tober 21, 1965

and Devsal.
Agreement between Devsal and
JDRDC that Devsal would transfer
interest in ranch in exchange for 51
percent of JDRDC capital stock.
Membership agreement of Wallace
High.
Amendment to land sale contract.
Membership agreement of Charles
Milbrandt.
Modification of land sale contract,

tober 28, 1965

Membership agreement of Robert
S. Lovell.

cember 1, 1965.

Membership agreement of Richard
G. Atchison.

cember 5, 1965.

Membership agreement of Floyd T.
Morrell.

cember 13, 1965.

Membership agreement of James
McFarlan.

nuary 23, 1967.

Devsal involuntarily dissolved by
corporation commissioner.

tober 5, 1967.

Morrell membership agreement
recorded

.ne 13, 1968.

Land sale contract recorded; High,
Milbrandt, Atchison membership
agreements recorded.

,gust 14, 1968.

JDRDC dissolved by corporation
commissioner.
Assignment by Devsal of vendee's
interest in land sale contract to
JDRDC.

Lgust 19, 1968

tgust 19, 1968.

Quitclaim deeds whereby Devsal
conveyed to JDRDC property in
Sherman and Gilliam Counties.
Copr.® West 1994 No claim to orig. U.S. Govt, works.
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August 1 9 , 1968

Release by Devsal and JDRDC of
obligations under agreement of
February 16, 1965.

J a n u a r y 2 1 , 1970

JDRDC reinstated by corporation
commissioner.

)ctober 1970.

Assignment to Davis by JDRDC of
vendee's interest in land sale
contract.

lovember 14, 1970.

Quitclaim deed executed by
Wallace High releasing to Davis High's
interest in his membership
agreement.

August 31, 1971.

Warranty deed from Davis to
Skyline Enterprises, Inc.

September 9, 1971.

Mortgage from Skyline Enterprises,
Inc., to Lomas & Nettleton
Financial Corp. to secure promissory
note of $700,000.

September 27, 1971,

Mortgage from Skyline Enterprises,
Inc., to Lomas & Nettleton
Financial Corp. to secure promissory
note of $350,000.

December 3, 1971.

Lovell membership agreement
recorded.

October 15, 1973.

Assignment of mortgages from
Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp. to
Lomas & Nettleton Co.
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*319 Apparently the development never got off
the ground, although a small number of
memberships had been sold. Eventually the vendee's
interest in the land sale contract was assigned back
to Davis. Davis subsequently conveyed the property
to Skyline, Inc., which borrowed the money and
issued the mortgages that are the subject of the
foreclosure suit.
[1] As previously noted, the trial court held that
although Lomas & Nettleton may have had notice or
knowledge of the membership **729 agreements,
that notice or knowledge, even coupled with the
other information available to Lomas & Nettleton,
was not sufficient "to create a permanent interest in
land which would have priority over a subsequent
purchaser or mortgage." The trial court held that it
did not need to reach the question whether the
membership agreements were valid as between the
parties to them. We disagree with this approach. In
our view, the controlling question to be decided in
this case is whether the membership agreements
conveyed interests in the land to the claimants. If
they did then, in our opinion, claimants would have
priority over all but bona fide purchasers without
notice of their interests. [FN2]
FN2. We agree with the finding of the trial
court that Luther Davis was the fee simple
owner of the property and that it was not
necessary for his wife to join in the land sale
contract to Devsal. Consequently, Mrs. Davis'
failure to sign the amendments to the contract
has no bearing on the validity of Devsal's
assignment of the vendee's interest to JDRDC.
*320 The validity of the membership agreements.
A. JDRDC could convey the hunting and fishing
rights to the Luther Davis ranch.
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interest (equitable title). It was not until August 19,
1968, that Devsal assigned its vendee's interest to
JDRDC. In other words, notwithstanding the recital
in the membership agreements that "John Day
Recreational Development Company is the owner of
a large body of land," JDRDC in fact had no
interest in the land at that time.
[2] [3] Lomas & Nettleton's contention overlooks
the fact that ORS 41.350(3) conclusively presumes,
between the parties, the truth of the recitals in a
written instrument. It follows that JDRDC and its
successors in interest, including Lomas & Nettleton,
are bound by the recital that JDRDC owned the
property. Cf. Emmons et al. v. Sanders et al., 217
Or. 234, 241, 342 P.2d 125 (1959).[FN3]
FN3. The same result follows under familiar
equitable principles. Devsal assigned its
vendee's interest to JDRDC on August 19,
1968. JDRDC would, therefore, be estopped to
deny its power to convey interests in the land to
the membership subscribers. Cf. Taggart v.
Risley, 4 Or. 235, 241 (1872). See also 2
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 865, s 658 (5th
ed 1941); 4 Tiffany, Law of Real Property
1103, s 1230 (3d ed 1975).
JDRDC's
successors in interest are similarly estopped.
Taggart v. Risley, supra.
[4] However, a further complication is introduced
in this case. On January 23, 1967, Devsal was
involuntarily dissolved by the corporation
commissioner and on August 14, 1968, JDRDC was
involuntarily dissolved. It was later reinstated, but
on August 19, when *321 Devsal assigned its
vendee's interest to JDRDC, neither corporation was
in legal existence.

Lomas & Nettleton contends the claimants could
not have acquired any rights because during the
period in which the membership agreements were
executed, September to December 1965, JDRDC
had no interest in the property and that its
subsequent acquisition was null and void.

ORS 57.630(2) provides:
"Whenever any such corporation is the owner of
real or personal property, or claims any interest or
lien whatsoever in any real or personal property,
such corporation shall continue to exist during
such five-year period for the purpose of
conveying, transferring and releasing such real or
personal property or interest or lien therein, * *

The record reveals that between September and
December 1965, when the membership agreements
were executed, Luther Davis had the vendor's
interest (legal title) and Devsal had the vendee's

Thus, Devsal was able to convey its vendee's
interest even after its dissolution. However, Lomas
& Nettleton contends that JDRDC could not accept
the conveyance while it was involuntarily dissolved,
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citing Klorfine v. Cole, 121 Or. 76, 82, 85, 252 P.
708, 254 P. 200 (1927). This court held in that case
that a purported conveyance to a dissolved
corporation was a nullity because the corporation
was "civilly dead." The question in the instant case
is whether **730 JDRDC's reinstatement by the
corporation commissioner on January 21, 1970,
validated transactions made during the period of
suspension.
There is a split of authority on the question
whether reinstatement of a repealed corporate
charter validates all acts of the corporation in the
interim period of suspension. See Annot., 13
A.L.R.2d 1220 (1950). While some states hold that
reinstatement "relates back" to the time of repeal,
this court has held that reinstatement does not cancel
the dissolution Ab initio, Lents, Inc. v. Borstad,
251 Or. 296, 299, 445 P.2d 597 (1968). The
opinion in that case notes, however, that the court
was not there concerned with the validation of
corporate
acts
between
dissolution
and
reinstatement. In Gillen-Cole Co. v. Fox & Co.,
146 Or. 208, 224, 29 P.2d 1019 (1934), this court
held that a reinstated corporation ratified what had
been done on its behalf during the period of
suspension. [FN4] JDRDC, after reinstatement,
assigned the vendee's interest in the land sale
contract back to Davis. This action, in our *322
opinion, was ratification by JDRDC of the
acceptance on its behalf of the benefits of the
contract while the corporation was dissolved.
FN4. Cf. Deschutes Co. v. Lara et al., 127 Or.
57, 73, 270 P. 913 (1928).
B. The membership agreements did not violate the
Statute of Frauds.
[5] [6] Claimants' purported interest in the
property based upon their membership agreements
can be classified as a "profit a prendre." In Bingham
v. Salene, 15 Or. 208, 214, 14 P. 523 (1887), this
court stated that the right to take something from the
land of another, including hunting and fishing, is a
"profit a prendre." The element of participation in
the soil and its produce distinguishes a profit from
an easement. A grant of a profit a prendre is a grant
of an interest in the land itself, and within the statute
of frauds. Id. at 212-13, 14 P. 523. See also
Hahner, An Analysis of Profits A Prendre, 25
Or.L.Rev. 217, 218, 233 (1946).
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The parties both recognize that the central issue in
these cases is the adequacy of the property
description in the membership agreements to satisfy
the statute of frauds, ORS 41.580.[FN5] Claimants
also contend that Lomas & Nettleton is a "stranger"
to these agreements and is precluded from raising
the statute of frauds. This contention may well have
merit. See Ringler v. Ruby, 117 Or. 455, 244 P.
509 (1926), and City of Medford v. Bessonette, 255
Or. 53, 58, 463 P.2d 865 (1970). We need not
decide that question, however, because we find the
property description to be adequate, for reasons
which we shall now discuss.
FN5. ORS 41.580 provides: "In the following
cases the agreement is void unless it, or some
note of memorandum thereof, expressing the
consideration, is in writing and subscribed by
the party to be charged, or by his lawfully
authorized agent; evidence, therefore, of the
agreement shall not be received other than the
writing, or secondary evidence of its contents
in the cases prescribed by law: " * * *sha "(5)
An agreement for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale of real
property, or of any interest therein."
It is conceded that the location of the land and its
description cannot be determined from the
membership *323 agreements alone. Lomas &
Nettleton argues that the description in the
agreements is patently ambiguous and that, for this
reason, no extrinsic evidence can be admitted to
identify the property covered by the agreements,
citing Hertel v. Woodard, 183 Or. 99, 191 P.2d 400
(1948); Bingham v. Honeyman, 32 Or. 129, 51 P.
735 (1898); Noyes v. Stauff, 5 Or. 455 (1875).
Although this court has, in the past, sometimes
used the terms "latent" and "patent" in deciding
when an ambiguity in a land description can be
explained by extrinsic evidence, our recent decisions
have avoided the use of those terms, and with good
reason. They are misleading, in our opinion, as is
the suggested conclusion that extrinsic evidence will
be freely admitted in the one instance but not in the
other. [FN6]
FN6. The purported rule has been described as
a thoroughly discredited misunderstanding of a
maxim laid down by Sir Francis Bacon. See
McBaine, The Rule Against Disturbing Plain
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Meaning of Writings, 31 Calif.L.Rev.
147 (1943).

145,

**731 [7] When the results of our prior cases are
examined, it is apparent that the real issue, when the
sufficiency of the description of land in a contract
subject to the statute of frauds is challenged, is
whether the written description, in light of the
ascertainable objective facts and without resort to
evidence of the parties' intentions or oral
discussions of the transaction, can be said with
reasonable certainty to apply only to one specific,
identifiable, piece of property. If so, the writing is
sufficient under the statute of frauds, although a
complete description of the property may have to be
obtained from other sources. For example, in
Kallstrom v. O'Callaghan, 259 Or. 210, 485 P.2d
1200 (1971), the writing (after reformation to
correct a conceded error) described the property as
M
the approx. 2 acre parcel located directly North and
contiguous to 19705 S.W. Boones Ferry Rd.
Tualatin, Oregon." Extrinsic evidence showed that
there was only one parcel of land, consisting of two
acres, directly north of and contiguous to the
address given. And in Burns v. Witter, 56 Or. 368,
108 P. 129 (1910), the property was *324 described
in the writing as "my farm containing 40 acres."
The memorandum did not mention the location of
the property, or state where the agreement was
executed. The court held that if the proof showed
that the sellers only owned one farm, and that that
farm consisted of 40 acres, the writing was
sufficiently definite for enforcement. See also
Phillips v. Johnson, 266 Or. 544, 514 P.2d 1337
(1973); Sherwood v. Gerking, 209 Or. 493, 306
P.2d 386 (1957) (broker's contract); Wurzweiler v.
Cox, 138 Or. 110, 5 P.2d 699 (1931); Bloech v.
Hyland Homes Co. et al., 119 Or. 297, 247 P. 761
(1926); Flegel v. Dowling, 54 Or. 40, 102 P. 178
(1909); Bogard v. Barhan, 52 Or. 121, 96 P. 673
(1908); House v. Jackson, 24 Or. 89, 32 P. 1027
(1893). But see Hughes v. Evans, 64 Or. 368, 130
P. 639 (1913) (result disapproved in Sherwood v.
Gerking, supra).
[8] If, on the other hand, extrinsic evidence
discloses that a written description can, with equal
accuracy, apply to more than one piece of property,
the writing will be held insufficient, and parol
evidence will not be permitted to explain which of
the possible properties the parties intended to
describe. In such a case the statute of frauds serves
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its intended function by preventing the enforcement
of an agreement when the subject matter of the
writing can be ascertained only by parol evidence of
the parties' agreement.
ORS 41.580 forbids
evidence, other than the writing, "of the
agreement." See n.5, Supra.
For example, in Meadowlark Inv. Corp. v.
Croeni, 237 Or. 535, 392 P.2d 327, 328 (1964), the
description in the writing (at 537) was:
"Residence and property belonging to Susan
Lehman located at 3805 N.W. Saltzman Road
Portland 10, Oreg. Said property consists of
approx. 39 acres and fronts on two sides of N.W.
Thompson Road and one side by Saltzman Road.
$

afe jje »•

On its face this description appears to be more
specific than many others which have been held
enforceable. Extrinsic evidence, however, showed
that the seller's property contained more than 46
acres, and that both *325 the street address and the
road frontage references in the writing applied to the
entire parcel. Therefore the description in the
writing did not provide any way to determine which
39 acres out of the 46 or more described was the
subject of the agreement. Parol evidence was not
admissible to show which 39 acres the parties
actually intended. To admit such evidence would
have been to admit evidence other than the writing
of the agreement itself. The agreement was held
unenforceable.
For similar decisions holding
writings unenforceable after considering evidence or
allegations which showed that the description in the
writing could be applied, with equal accuracy, to
more than one piece of land, See Hink et ux v.
Bowlsby et al., 199 Or. **732 238, 260 P.2d 1091
(1953); Trumbly et al. v. Fixley, 178 Or. 458, 168
P.2d 571 (1946); Woolsey v. Draper et al., 103 Or.
103, 201 P. 730, 203 P. 582 (1921).
In all of the above cases, whether the writing was
ultimately held enforceable or unenforceable,
extrinsic evidence was examined or held admissible
in order to determine whether the description in the
writing, when read in light of known facts about the
parties and the property purportedly covered, was
fatally ambiguous. In none of them was parol
evidence of the parties' understanding or oral
agreement allowed to cure such an ambiguity if
extrinsic evidence showed it to exist.
[9] Sometimes it may appear from the description
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itself, without the need to consider extrinsic
evidence, that the description could apply to more
than one piece of property. See, for example, Coast
Brokers v. Hickman, 239 Or. 121, 396 P.2d 756
(1964) ("two tracts of land one of 5 acres and one of
7 acres adjoining Honey man park south of
Florence."); Hertel v. Woodard, 183 Or. 99, 191
P.2d 400 (1948) ("lot and house number 960 Union
Street" but no indication of city, county, or state, or
that seller presently owned the lot and house to be
conveyed); Noyes v. Stauff, 5 Or. 455 (1875)
("house which is to be in construction"). See also
Hyland v. Oregon Agricultural Co., I l l Or. 212,
*326 225 P. 728 (1924); Bingham v. Honeyman, 32
Or. 129, 51 P. 735, 52 P. 755 (1898); Whiteaker v.
Vanschoiack, 5 Or. 113 (1873). In these cases,
because it is apparent from the face of the writing
that the ambiguity cannot be cured without resort to
parol evidence of the parties' intentions, the writing
is held unenforceable.
To summarize, if it is clear from the face of the
writing that the description could apply with equal
accuracy to more than one piece of property, it is
unenforceable by reason of that fact. If the written
description might possibly apply to but one piece of
land, evidence is admissible to determine whether
there is only one, or more than one, to which it
might apply.
If it can be determined with
reasonable certainty that there is only one, the
written description is sufficiently definite to meet
the requirements of the statute of frauds although the
complete description must be supplied from other
sources.
If, however, the extrinsic evidence
demonstrates that there is more than one piece of
property to which the description in the writing can
accurately apply the description is ambiguous and
the writing will be held insufficient.
This is
essentially what this court said in Burns v. Witter,
56 Or. 368, 371, 108 P. 129, 130 (1910):
"If, on its face, the memorandum contain such a
specification of real property that by the aid of
parol testimony the description given can apply to
only one particular tract of land, it is sufficient;
but if it appear, from extrinsic evidence, that the
delineation set forth can refer to more than one
parcel, the ambiguity is patent and the instrument
void for uncertainty * * *." [FN7]
FN7. The textwriters on real property
transactions do not discuss the problem of the
sufficiency of land descriptions or the
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admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the terms
we have employed here. We have reexamined
the results of our cases and described what we
have done because we find the traditional
treatment of these questions not particularly
helpful. See, for example, 4 Tiffany, Real
Property 229, s 997 (3d ed 1975): "In all
instruments for conveyance of land, the
description thereof must be sufficiently definite
and certain upon the face of instrument itself,
or in some other writing referred to, that the
land can be identified with reasonably
certainty; otherwise the instrument is void
under the Statute of Frauds.
Generally,
however, a written description suffices to
satisfy the statute if it is sufficiently definite,
with the aid of extrinsic evidence, to identify
the land sought to be described. Under the rule
a latent but not a patent ambiguity may be
resolved by extrinsic evidence." (Footnotes
omitted) See also 6 Thompson on Real Property
462-67, ss 3025, 3026 (1962); 3 Casner,
American Law of Property 19-20, s 11.5
(1952). The inconsistent results which the
traditional rules have produced can be seen in
the cases collected in Annot., Sufficiency of
Description or Designation of Land in Contract
or Memorandum of Sale, under State of
Frauds, 23 A.L.R.2d 6 (1952).
Professor
Corbin argues for a liberal approach to testing
the adequacy of the description, and does not
make it clear whether he would or would not
allow evidence of the parties' oral agreements
or their understanding of the transaction itself.
2 Corbin on Contracts 718-19, s 505 (1950).
As we have indicated, we have found sufficient
guidance in the results of our prior cases for the
decision now before us. The parties have not
argued, and we need not here consider, whether
parol evidence of the parties' negotiations or
intentions should ever be admissible.
*327 **733 The facts of our cases illustrate some
of the kinds of extrinsic evidence which can show
that the writing can apply to only one piece of land.
If, for example, the writing refers to "my ranch" or
"his residence" and to the general location, extrinsic
evidence may show that the seller owns only one
ranch or residence in that area, and that it conforms
to other characteristics mentioned in the writing.
See, e. g., Burns v. Witter, supra; Bogard v.
Barhan, 52 Or. 121, 96 P. 673 (1908); Cf.
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Henderson v. Lemke, 60 Or. 363, 119 P. 428
(1911) (broker's contract). Or the evidence may
show that there is but one piece of property in the
area which is described by a distinctive name which
is employed in the writing. See, e. g., Sherwood v.
Gerking, 209 Or. 493, 306 P.2d 386 (1957);
Wurzweiler v. Cox, 138 Or. 110, 5 P.2d 699
(1931); Bloech v. Hyland Homes Co. et al., 119 Or.
297, 247 P. 761 (1926); Flegel v. Dowling, 54 Or.
40, 102 P. 178 (1909); House v. Jackson, 24 Or.
89, 32 P. 1027 (1893). Recitals in the writing as to
where the parties reside or where the writing was
executed can be used as an indication of the general
area in which the property is located, and may
combine with extrinsic evidence to show that the
applicability of an otherwise general description is
sufficiently limited. *328 See Wurzweiler v. Cox,
supra; Flegel v. Dowling, supra; Bogard v. Barhan,
supra. There are, undoubtedly, other kinds of
extrinsic evidence which can indicate that the
written description, although general in terms, can
with reasonable certainty be applied to a given piece
of property and no other.
Thus, the problem in this case is to determine
whether, in light of the available extrinsic evidence
other than that of the parties' negotiations and
intentions, the language of the membership
agreements applies with reasonable certainty to a
single identifiable piece of property and no other.
The agreements, all of which are identical in this
respect, recite that:
" * * * John Day Recreational Development
Company is the owner of a large body of land
consisting of some 18,000 acres owned in fee * *
* and * * * said land has a frontage upon the John
Day River and its tributaries approximating 35
miles, and * * * the John Day Recreational
Development is developing the said premises for
an exclusive hunting and fishing club * * *."
The agreements also contain the additional
information that "Luther W. Davis, ex ux" are
"holders in fee," and that the premises are to be
known and referred to as the "High Country."
The agreements make no mention of the state or
general area where the land in question is located.
The only John Day River in the United States listed
in standard reference works is in Oregon. [FN8]
Actually, there are two John Day Rivers in Oregon,
one in the eastern portion of the state and one in
Clatsop County.[FN9] Other references in the

agreements, however, when read in light of the
extrinsic evidence, make it clear that the reference in
those agreements is to the well-known John Day
River in eastern Oregon.
FN8. The Times Atlas of the World, index at
26 (Mid-Cent ed 1957); 30 Encyclopedia
Americana 369 (1957).
FN9. See McArthur, Oregon Geographic Place
Names 327 (3d ed 1952).
*329 The record does not show that JDRDC
owned any land in the area at the time the
agreements were executed. There is, however,
evidence that Luther Davis owned a "large body of
land" in the John Day River area, with an
unspecified amount of frontage on the river and its
tributaries, and that Davis, at that time, believed
that his wife was a co-owner.
[10] The reference in the agreements to the Davis
ownership does not, alone, serve to identify the
property covered by the **734 writings because
Davis, either individually or with his wife, owned
adjoining property, under cultivation, which was not
being "developed" by JDRDC. However, the
record does establish the following: Devsal was the
equitable owner, by virtue of a land sale contract
containing a complete description, of a portion of
the Davis property. The contract contemplated a
transfer to JDRDC, which would promote and sell
memberships constituting rights in that land. Devsal
owned and controlled JDRDC. JDRDC was, at the
time the membership agreements were executed,
actively promoting memberships in an "exclusive
hunting and fishing club" with membership rights to
be exercised on that same land. It was not involved
in the development or promotion of any other
hunting and fishing club."
When all of this evidence is considered together it
establishes with reasonable certainty, in our opinion,
that a specific piece of property that described in the
land sale contract between the Davises and Devsal
was the only property to which the membership
agreements could apply.[FN10] It follows, in our
judgment, *330 that the purposes of the statute of
frauds were satisfied: the subject matter of the
membership agreements can be determined from the
writings and other evidence, without the necessity of
considering testimony by the parties to those
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agreements about their intentions or negotiations.
For these reasons, we hold that the membership
agreements are specific enough to be enforceable.
FN 10. There is one difficulty with this
conclusion which we have not overlooked the
recital in the membership agreements that the
property in question consists of "some 18,000
acres." The property described in the land sale
contract amounts to slightly more than half that
number of acres. However, this discrepancy is
not fatal to the enforceability of the
agreements. The evidence leaves no doubt that
the "High Country" area which was being
promoted by JDRDC was only that described in
the contract. The extrinsic fact which limits
the applicability of the membership agreements
is JDRDCs activity with respect to the land.
The statement of acreage in those agreements is
erroneous, but does not create an ambiguity, in
our opinion.
C. Not all of the claimants are entitled to the
recreational rights.
The trial court noted that there are questions as to
whether two of the claimants, High and Stearns, are
entitled to the recreational rights because High
quitclaimed his interest back to Davis and Stearns
could not produce his membership agreement at
trial.
On November 14, 1970, High executed a
quitclaim deed whereby he released his right, title
and interest in his membership agreement to Luther
Davis.[FN 11] High concedes that this deed was
delivered to Davis but contends that the deed was
executed and delivered at Davis' request to remove a
cloud on his title and on the condition that it would
be binding only if Davis executed another agreement
permitting the members to hunt and fish on the
property and only if all of the other members would
sign similar quitclaim deeds.
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unconditional or any conditions must be satisfied.
Parol evidence is admissible to determine whether in
fact there has been a valid delivery. See Putnam et
ux v. Jenkins et ux, 204 Or. 691, 724-25, 285 P.2d
532 (1955); Lancaster v. May, *331 as
Administrator, 194 Or. 647, 654, 243 P.2d 268
(1952). See also 26 C.J.S. Deeds s 48 (1956).
However, it is a general rule that "placing a grantee
in possession of a deed absolute on its face
constitutes delivery and transfers title to him
regardless of the imposition of any collateral
condition or contingency as to its operative effect."
3 Casner, American Law of Property 316-17, s
12.66 (1952). Parol evidence is not admissible to
show that a deed which has been executed and
delivered is subject to any conditions not appearing
on the face of the deed. 32A C.J.S. Evidence s 940
(1964). See also Harmon v. Grants Pass B. & T.
Co., **735 60 Or. 69, 75, 118 P. 188 (1911).
Therefore, the execution and delivery of the
quitclaim deed precludes High from now asserting
rights under his membership agreement.
Stearns testified that he was issued an executed
copy of the agreement on the same day as
Milbrandt, but that he did not know what happened
to it. He also testified that he originally issued a
note for $2,000 as consideration but that the note
was canceled and Stearns was given the membership
in exchange for promotional and other work he had
done for JDRDC. Stearns hunted and fished on the
property in 1965 and 1966. Stearns' testimony was
corroborated by Milbrandt who testified that he was
present when Stearns' membership agreement was
executed.

FN11. There is insufficient evidence to support
Lomas & Nettleton's contention that "similar
quitclaim deeds were executed and delivered by
each of High et al. except Richard Atchison."

[14] The statute of frauds, ORS 41.580, provides
that evidence of an agreement for the sale of an
interest in real property must be proved by the
writing or secondary evidence of its contents.
Stearns has attempted to prove by oral testimony
that there was a writing and the contents thereof.
Normally such evidence would be precluded by the
"best evidence rule," ORS 41.640, until the party
shows that he could not produce the original writing
in a reasonable time by the exercise of a reasonable
effort to do so. Velasquez v. Freeman, 244 Or. 40,
47, 415 P.2d 514 (1966).

[11] [12] [13] There is a critical distinction between
a conditional delivery of a deed and a conditional
conveyance. To be effective a delivery must be

[15] Objection was made to the introduction of
this evidence on the basis of the "best evidence rule"
but *332 the objection was overruled because
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Stearns "indicated he didn't know what happened to
it." Technically speaking, the trial court should not
have admitted the secondary evidence before
determining the extent of Stearns' diligence in
searching for the document, Velasquez, supra. We
note, however, that the evidence overwhelmingly
points to the fact that Steams' membership
agreement was identical in form and content to all
the other membership agreements involved in this
case. Under such circumstances the following
quotation from McCormick, Handbook on the Law
of Evidence 577-78, s 243 (2d ed 1972), is
appropriate:
" * * * (T)he requirement of the production of
original writings, with the several excuses for
nonproduction and the exceptions to the
requirement itself, make up a fairly complex set of
regulations for administration by the trial judge.
Mistakes in the application of these rules are,
understandably, not infrequent. The purpose of
this system of rules, on the other hand, is simple
and practical. That purpose is to secure the most
reliable information as to the contents of
documents, when those terms are disputed. A
mystical ideal of seeking 'the best evidence' or the
'original document,' as an end in itself is no
longer the goal. Consequently when an attack is
made, on motion for new trial or on appeal, upon
the judge's admission of secondary evidence, it
seems that the reviewing tribunal, should
ordinarily make inquiry of the complaining
counsel, 'Does the party whom you represent
actually dispute the accuracy of the evidence
received as to the material terms of the writing?'
If the counsel cannot assure the court that such a
good faith dispute exists, it seems clear that any
departure from the regulations in respect to
secondary evidence must be classed as harmless
error. (Footnote omitted)"
We find as a fact that Stearns was issued a
membership agreement identical in terms to those of
the other members and is able to assert the rights
created by the agreements.
The issue of notice.
[16] For Lomas & Nettleton's mortgage to be
superior to the rights of the claimants, it must have
taken its *333 mortgage in good faith for value and
without notice of the outstanding interests. See
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Landigan v. Mayer, 32 Or. 245, 252, 51 P. 649
(1898). The notice that will deprive the mortgagee
of priority can be either actual or constructive.
Actual notice is direct knowledge of the outstanding
interest. See Seguin et al. v. Maloney-Chambers,
198 Or. 272, 285, 253 P.2d 252, 256 P.2d 514
(1953). Constructive notice encompasses both
notice chargeable under the recording statute, ORS
93.710, and "inquiry notice." See Belt et ux v.
Matson et al., 120 Or. 313, 321, 252 P. 80 (1927).
**736 [17] Lomas & Nettleton was not charged
with record notice because the membership
agreements were not properly acknowledged before
recordation. ORS 93.480; 8 Thompson on Real
Property 302-16, s 4304 (1963). If Lomas &
Nettleton or an agent nevertheless had checked the
record the company would then have had actual
notice of the interests asserted by claimants. We
find no evidence that Lomas & Nettleton had actual
notice either by virtue of checking the records or
otherwise.
[18] We do find, however, that Lomas &
Nettleton had "inquiry notice ." Before loaning
funds to Skyline Enterprises, Inc., Lomas &
Nettleton received a preliminary title report from a
title company containing the following exceptions:
"6. The right, title and interest of John Day
Recreational Development Company, evidenced
by the issuance of Founders memberships in an
exclusive hunting and fishing club on the above
premises, some of which are recorded.
"7. The right, title and interest of the membership
holders described at No. 6 above."
The title insurance policies, as issued, also include
exceptions for "the right, title and interest of
membership holders in and to an exclusive hunting
and fishing club under the rights and interest of the
John Day Recreational Development Company."
*334 We hold that under these circumstances
Lomas & Nettleton had a duty to inquire of the
organization or members asserting hunting and
fishing rights to determine the extent of the interest
claimed. Lomas & Nettleton failed to make such
inquiry, but is now charged with notice of the facts
that would have been discovered by such an inquiry.
Belt et ux v. Matson et al., supra. It follows that
Lomas & Nettleton's security interest has no priority
over the interests of claimants.
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Miscellaneous contentions.
A. Lomas & Nettleton cannot assert a purported
violation of the securities law.
[19] Lomas & Nettleton contends that the sales of
membership agreements were sales of securities and
the failure to register these securities made their sale
"void" under ORS 59.250, which was in force at the
time of sale but has since been repealed. We need
not decide whether the sale of membership
agreements constituted the sale of securities because
even if it did, Lomas & Nettleton has no standing by
reason of the fact that it was not a party to the
alleged illegal transaction. See Austin v. Hallmark
Oil Co., 21 Cal.2d 718, 134 P.2d 777, 783 (1943),
and Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal.2d 864, 69
Cal.Rptr. 612, 652, 442 P.2d 692, 732 (1968),
decided under the California statute (Cal.Corp.Code
s 26100 (1965)), which also provided that sales of
securities without a permit were "void." See also
Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 131-33 (1958).
B. A declaration that the membership agreements
are valid is not inequitable.
[20] Lomas & Nettleton contends that allowing
the membership agreements priority over its
mortgages would yield an inequitable result in thai
the claimants had *335 unclean hands and would be
unjustly enriched.
There was no evidence that a violation of the
securities law, if there was one, was knowing or
intentional. We do not believe that under the
circumstances of this case the claimants can be said
to have "unclean hands." At any rate, the issue is
the priority of interests in the foreclosure suit and
iMs is not affected by any purported violation of the
securities law.
We also do not believe that the claimants will be
unjustly enriched. They are receiving what they
bargained and paid for.
C. Lomas & Nettleton is not subrogated to the
rights of lienholders whose claims were paid from
the proceeds of the mortgages.
[21][22] Lomas & Nettleton contends that the
funds it supplied to Skyline were **737 used to
discharge other liens which were prior to the
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interests of the claimants and that consequently it
should be subrogated to the rights of the prior
lienors to the extent those liens were paid by its
funds.
It is possible for a mortgagee to be
subrogated to the rights of a prior lienor. See
Annot., Subrogation to Prior Lien of One Who
Advances Money to Discharge It and Takes New
Mortgage, as Against Intervening Lienor, 70
A.L.R. 1396 (1931); 83 C.J.S. Subrogation s 36,
pp. 645-46 (1953). However, the principles which
permit subrogation in these instances are equitable.
Lomas & Nettleton had notice of the existence of
membership agreements creating hunting and fishing
rights, and chose to proceed with the mortgage
transaction without further investigation. Under
these circumstances, there are insufficient equities in
its favor to convince us that it should be subrogated
to the rights of prior lienors whose liens were
discharged out of the mortgage proceeds, and thus to
foreclose those hunting and fishing rights.
In summary, then, we hold that except for High,
who quitclaimed to Davis the rights he had acquired
under his membership agreement, the claimants have
interests in the property, by virtue of their
membership agreements, which are superior to that
of Lomas & Nettleton. The case is remanded for
modification of the foreclosure decree in accordance
with this opinion.
LENT, Justice, specially concurring.
I concur in the result and with the basic approach
to that result. I must express my reservations,
however, concerning the use of the term "reasonable
certainty" to describe the quantum of persuasion
necessary to establish a real property description by
extrinsic evidence so as to avoid the impact of the
Statute of Frauds.
The term is merely a label which has no precise
meaning; therefore, the trier of fact has a task
impossible to perform upon a logical basis. If the
court requires that the evidence to establish the
property description be more than that necessary to
establish the affirmative of the issue by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court should
candidly say so. If that is what Is meant by use of
the term, I would then dissent for reasons to which I
have alluded earlier.
See Hardwick v. Dravo
Equipment Company, 279 Or. 619, 630, 569 P.2d
588 (1977) (Lent, J., specially concurring).
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Compare, Jensen v. Miller, 280 Or. 225, 229, 570
P.2d 375, 377 (1977), footnote 1.
That this court has used the term in such ways as
to illustrate its inherent imprecision appears from a
comparison of its use in Dravo with its use in Cont.
Plants v. Measured Mkt., 274 Or. 621, 624, 547
P.2d 1368 (1976). In Dravo the term was used to
described some measure greater than mere
probability, while in Cont. Plants the court said that
it meant no more than probability. It is true that
both cases were concerned with the sufficiency of
evidence to establish damages; however, I think that
is a difference without distinction. The fact remains
that the term is imprecise and tends to confuse.
END OF DOCUMENT
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BRADLEY et al. v. F R A Z I E R PARK PLAYGROUNDS, Inc. et al.
Civ. 4351.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
California.
April 21, 1952.
Hearing Denied June 19, 1952.
Grace Bradley and others sued Frazier
Park Playgrounds, Inc., and others to establish their right to use certain recreational
facilities which were included within the
real estate development in which they had
bought lots relying upon salesmen's representations that they would have permanent use
of such facilities without restriction. The
Superior Court, Kern County, Robert B.
Lambert, J., entered judgment for plaintiffs,
and one defendant appealed. The District
Court of Appeal, Griffin, J., held that plaintiffs were entitled to an equitable easement
to use such facilities, though no such right
of use or easement had been granted by written conveyance.
Affirmed.
1. Easements <§=>I6

Where, in advertising sale of lots in
real estate development, lots were located
on map showing playground area, club
house, and lakes, and availability of such
recreational facilities, which were owned
by owner of development, was given great
emphasis by promoters of development and
there was evidence that purchasers of lots
relied upon salesmen's representations that
they would have permanent use of such facilities without restriction, such purchasers
were entitled to equitable easement to use
such facilities, though no such right of
use or easement was granted by written
conveyance. Civ.Code §§ 801 et seq., 1104.
2. Easements €=>30(l), 61(8)

Mere nonuser does not necessarily constitute abandonment of an easement, and
therefore in action to establish equitable
easement, trial court did not abuse discretion in denying defendant right to amend
answer so as to include defense of abandonment by reason of nonuser for over 14
years. Civ.Code, §§ 801 et seq., 1104.
3. Easements $=>36(3)

terest of such development which included
certain recreational facilities to establish
equitable easement to use such facilities,
evidence did not establish, as contended by
defendant, that purchasers had abandoned
or intended to abandon any of the rights
claimed by nonuser for over 14 years.

William R. Hulsy, Bakersfield, for appellant.
Siemon & Siemon, Bakersfield, for respondents.
GRIFFIN, Justice.
In 1924, a real estate promotion was commenced by a group of real estate operators
who had organized, in August, 1924, a
corporation known as "Frazier Mountain
Park and Fisheries Company, Inc." This
corporation secured about 800 acres of real •
property for subdivision purposes lying to
the west of U. S. Highway 99, approximately on the border line between Kern County
and Ventura County, in the mountainous
area just south of Lebec. One Harry G.
MacBain was president and the moving
spirit in its promotion. In the heart of the
subdivision was a playground area consisting of about ten or twelve acres, sometimes
desigpated in the evidence as the "commons". It contained some springs and a
grove of trees through which flowed the
Cuddy Creek. Artificial lakes were excavated to take advantage of certain waters
which were there available. Subdivision
maps of the several tracts were duly recorded and lots were sold according to said
maps. The entire subdivision contained in
excess of 1700 numbered lots. The general
subdivision map (Exhibit 1) which does not
appear to have been recorded, designated
-the numbered lots and showed the unnumbered area containing the "commons" and,
the lakes above described. A footnote is
set forth on that map as follows: "AU
streets, trails, drives, or unnumbered areas
adjacent thereto, are reserved for the use^
of owners of real property within said subdivision and are not dedicated to the public"

The rustic clubhouse or lodge was erect*
In action by purchasers of lots in real
estate development against successor in in- ed in this unnumbered area which wlfc lised)
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as a meeting place for the residents and
property owners and which was also used
as the focal point in the promotion of the
sale of lots in the subdivision. The Frazier
park Water Company, a corporation, was
organized in March, 1926, for the purpose
of producing and distributing water to the
lots in the subdivision. Upon the completion of payments, after the sale of the lots,
each purchaser of a lot was entitled to receive two shares of stock in the water company.
Mr. MacBain and his associates envisioned the area as being a natural resort
and playground spot, and took the steps
which they considered necessary to make
it so. Five artificial lakes were constructed
in the playground area of the property.
Cabins were erected for rentals, and the
real estate promotion boomed. A large
number of lots were sold for cabin sites,
and many summer homes were erected within the subdivided portions of the area.
One of the selling points for the lots was
the representation that with each lot the
purchaser would receive the right to membership in a "Rod and Gun Club" (later to
be called a "Rod and Reel Club") which
club would own and operate the clubhouse
and grounds, and which would maintain
fish in the lakes, and would carry on the
usual activities of a country club. Membership in the club was to be based either
on ownership of lots in the subdivision or
could be purchased by non-lot-owners at the
discretion of the board of directors of the
club. The printed matter furnished to potential purchasers suggested that the club
membership would increase in worth and
and be of great value. The Frazier Mountain Park and Fisheries Company, Inc., on
October 8, 1928, borrowed a sum up to
$400,000 on bearer promissory notes, secured by a trust deed, not only on all of the
unsold lots in the tracts numbered 1 to 5
inclusive, in the area, but also the lots which
had been sold on contract, and in addition,
all of the unsubdivided portion of the land,
including the area on which the lakes, playgrounds, and clubhouse were situated. The
Metropolitan Trust Company was named
as trustee under the deed of trust

All of the expenses incident to the clearing of the playground area, the building of
the clubhouse, the excavation for the lakes,
the stocking of the lakes with fish, and
the care and maintenance of the area, were
borne by the real estate promoters up to the
time that the Frazier Mountain Rod and
Reel Club was created on March 1, 1926.
(MacBain's attorney was one of the incorporates.) After that time the Rod and
Reel Club operated the clubhouse and the
grounds, stocked the lakes with fish, and
generally conducted the area in the normal
manner for the benefit of its members, collecting dues, incurring expenses for the
pumping of the water into the lakes, stocking them with fish, and paying out money
for care and improvements on the grounds.
In 1933 the Rod and Reel Club was permitted to lapse into inactivity from which
it has never revived. Its unpaid obligation
to the water company for water pumped
into the lakes amounted to approximately
$9,000.
The Frazier Mountain Park and Fisheries
Company, Inc., and its successor, the Harry
G. MacBain Corporation, Ltd., used the
usual and customary type of contract of
sale for real property, which contained the
words: "It is further agreed that the seller shall, not be responsible or liable for any
inducement, promise, representation, agreement or stipulation not set forth herein."
On its face it contained no grant of membership in the Rod and Reel Club, but on
the reverse side there was printed: "Sample
of Membership given with each lot", and
'This certifies that
is a member of
the Frazier Mountain Park Rod and Reel
Club and entitled to all the benefits and
privileges thereto". The face of the deed
contained merely the usual grants and restrictions, and contained no reference to
the shares in the water company, the membership in the Rod and Reel Club, or any
of the easements or rights here claimed.
From the inception of the subdivision, apparently there was great emphasis placed
on the value of the area as a playground
spot, and the fact that the property owners
would be able to use the lakes, the clubhouse, the playgrounds and the picnic
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grounds, through their membership in the
Rod and Reel club and by virtue of their
ownership of the lots. During the trial
there were numerous bits of testimony in
which persons who later purchased lots,
or who were considered as prospects, were
told by salesmen for the owners that the
whole area would be permanently available
to them for their use as a playground.
Also, advertisements were introduced into
evidence which had been taken from local
newspapers, etc., showing that there was a
great deal of emphasis placed on the fact
that the area would be devoted to use as a
playground and that ownership in the lots
would carry with it the right to catch
fish in the various lakes. Salesmen employed by the owners also testified that they
made these representations to prospective
purchasers and that the permanent use of
the playgrounds and lakes was without restriction. Several salesmen testified that
Mr. MacBain and his sales agent authorized them to so represent the property to
the prospective lot buyers. Many of the
purchasers who testified stated that they
relied on these representations and the
court, by its decision, at least impliedly
found that this was true.
It appears that the 1929 depression so affected the area that the sale of lots fell off,
and the real estate promotion bogged down.
By 1931, most of the activities of the area
ceased, including the full operation of the
clubhouse, the lakes, the grounds and the
water company.
In 1931, a group of residents undertook
to operate the water company in order to
supply water to the residents. Ultimately,
a public utility district was formed, and
the furnishing and distribution of water
was taken over by the defendant Frazier
Park Public Utility District, a public corporation.
The Harry G. MacBain Corporation,
Ltd., kept a caretaker on the premises until
1932, when possession was released to the
Metropolitan Trust Company, as trustee,
under the deed of trust above mentioned.
The clubhouse grounds and lakes were
used occasionally by the residents and property owners and on occasion the clubhouse

was open to groups for rental with the permission of the caretaker.
On July 19, 1940, the Pacific Capital, Ltd.,
a corporation, filed an action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against
the Metropolitan Trust Company, as trustee, and against the owners of the bearer
notes which had been given at the time of
the floating of the loan. It prayed, among
other things, that Harry G. MacBain Corporation surrender its bearer notes to the
trustee in exchange for a quitclaim deed
from the Metropolitan Trust Company to
the purchasers who had purchased lots from
the Frazier Mountain Park and Fisheries
Company, Inc., or from the Harry G. MacBain Corporation, Ltd., its successor, which
purchasers had paid the full purchase price
for the property, but for which there had
been no release secured from the trust company. It also asked that the trustee be instructed to dispose of the property because
of the fact that the trustor corporation had
for many years failed to operate the clubhouse, swimming pool, playgrounds, lakes,
and other improvements on the property,
and that the trust company had advanced
sums to pay taxes and insurance on the
clubhouse and upon the improved portions
of the unsubdivided property, and because it
had been forced to maintain, at its expense,
a caretaker on the property. That court
granted the relief prayed for and ordered
the trust company to immediately take
measures looking toward the sale of the
trust property to defray costs of administration of the trust, and ordered that any
balance be paid to the bearers of the promissory notes.
The trust company unsuccessfully attempted to sell the real property to the
county of Kern to be used by the county as
a recreational area for $12,500. Subsequently, the Frazier Park .Playgrounds, Inc.,
a corporation, was formed by defendant
Harry H. Holland for the purpose of purchasing the property. In December, 1941,
it purchased the property, including the
clubhouse, grounds, and lakes, from the
trust company for $12,500, 09 an agreement
of sale by the terms of which the corporation took title to the property and gave back
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a deed of trust for $7,500, being the unpaid
balance of the purchase price. The unsold
lots in the subdivision were quitclaimed
by the trust company to the Frazier Park
Playgrounds, Inc., because many of them
had been forfeited to the State for unpaid
taxes. The unsubdivided portion of the
property was conveyed to the Frazier Park
Playgrounds, Inc., by grant deed. Thereafter, the Frazier Park Playgrounds, Inc.,
attempted to open the clubhouse commercially but it was never able to operate it
on a profitable basis. Thereafter, there was
occasional use of the swings, croquet court,
clubhouse and horseshoe pits by residents
and lot owners.
In 1947, the Frazier Park Playgrounds,
Inc. fenced the clubhouse and the playgrounds, and permitted cattle to graze in the
enclosed area. This act was met with
strong disapproval by persons who owned
lots in the subdivided portion of the area,
and this action was filed by four of them,
as representatives of a class, to have their
rights determined to the use of the clubhouse, playgrounds, swings, right to take
water, and to fish in the lakes without hindrance.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged all of the
facts hereinabove mentioned and prayed
that the rights of the plaintiffs, as members of a class, be recognized by law, and
enforced, and that the defendant Frazier
Park Playgrounds, Inc., be required to remove its fence, and that it grant the plaintiffs, as members of a class, the right to
perpetual use of the clubhouse, lakes, playgrounds, and other improvements within
the unsubdivided area.
Defendant Frazier Park Playgrounds,
Inc., answered that it was a successor in interest of the Metropolitan Trust Company
which had sold the trust property at a distress sale, under instructions from the
court It denied that the plaintiffs had any
rights to the property and alleged that this
property had remained unused for many
years. However, it failed to specifically
plead abandonment of these claimed rights
by the plaintiffs.
The court found generally in accordance
with the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint,
including the allegations that the grounds
242 P.2d—61

which included the springs constituted a
natural park and that the property which
was subdivided had been sold to the public,
with the representation that the area, which
contained the swings, playgrounds, walks,
artificial lakes, and clubhouse, including
the springs, had been sold to purchasers
with the representation that they would be
entitled, perpetually, to the use thereof;
that these claimed rights were at all times
open and notorious and of common knowledge. It specifically found that there had
been no public dedication of this area for
the purposes indicated. Judgement was entered accordingly and by mandatory injunction the court specifically designated
the property to which the easement related
and granted unrestricted and uninhibited
ingress thereto and egress therefrom by
the property owners, and restrained appellant Harry H. Holland, successor in interest
to the Frazier Park Playgrounds, Inc., and
his agents, from in any manner interfering
with or obstructing said uses, and further
ordered that a prescribed portion of the
fence surrounding the area be removed, and
required the defendants to permit the owners of lots in said tracts to have ready access to the same and to the clubhouse and
to the other improvements thereon, without
hindrance, subject, however, to certain prescribed rules. It was ordered that plaintiffs take nothing against defendant Frazier
Park Public Utility District, a corporation.
Harry H. Holland, as successor in interest of the Frazier Park Playgrounds, Inc.
appealed from the judgment
The evidence fully supports the court's
finding that it was the intention of the subdivider and of its sales agents to create and
set aside a portion of the subdivision as a
"commons" or playgrounds, for the specified use and benefit of the purchasers of
lots, in perpetuity. The subdivision map so
indicates. The price obtained for the lots
clearly indicates such rights were considered a portion of the price paid. Appellant Holland and his predecessors in interest apparently had knowledge of these
facts or, at least, evidence of these claimed
rights and privileges was, as found by the
court, so notorious and of such common
knowledge as to impart notice to them.
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The evidence shows that Holland lived
near the park before, during and after its
inception and visited it during the sale and
promotion of the tract; that in 1935, he
bought adjoining land; that in 1941, he and
a lot owner in the park who purchased his
lot on the representation that the unsubdivided portion was reserved for the use
of the lot owners, joined in forming the
Frazier Mountain Park Playgrounds, Inc.,
for the purpose of buying a portion of the
tract with the idea of conducting a private
park enterprise. (Holland subsequently
purchased this lot owner's interest in the
corporation.)
In Ocean Shore R. R. Co. v. Spring
Valley Water Company, 218 Cal. 86, 21 P.2d
588, the court held that every person having actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as
to a particular fact is charged with constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry,
he might have learned such fact. That case
quoted with approval from Chicago & E. I.
R. R. v. Wright, 153 111. 307, 38 N.E. 1062,
wherein it is said (quoting from Indiana,
B. & W. R. Co. v. McBroom, 114 Ind. 198,
15 N.E. 831):
"' "A person who is about to purchase land upon which a grade for a
railroad is constructed is warned that
there is some claim of right, and if he
fails to make proper inquiry as to the
nature of the claim he buys at his
peril;" * * * A man cannot buy
property where there are facts known
to him sufficient to put him upon inquiry, and hold it free from prior
claims or equities of which due inquiry
would have given him information/ "
[218 Cal. 86, 21 P.2d 589.] (See also,
Wallace v. Whitmore, 47 Cal.App.2d
369, 374, 117 P.2d 926; De La Cuesta
v. Bazzi, 47 Cal.App.2d 661, 668, 118
P.2d 909; and 74 A.L.R. 1250; 9 Cal.
Jur. p. 956, sec. 10.)
[1] The main question involved is the
authority of the trial court to hold that
the property owners in the area were entitled to a so-called "equitable easement" to
the use of the grounds, clubhouse, and lakes,

where no such right of use or easement was
granted by the written conveyance.
It was said in Danielson v. Sykes, 157
Cal. 686, 109 P. 87, 28 L.R.A.,N.S., 1024,
that where a lot conveyed by deed is described by reference to a map, such map is
made a part of the deed; that if streets are
marked on the ground in the absence of a
map, and lots are sold on the representation
that such streets exist, the appurtenant
right to use the streets, not expressed in
the deed, rests upon an equitable estoppel;
that the right of the owner may be enforced
in equity with respect to all the streets
which the particular lot owner has occasion
to use; and any street or alley in close
vicinity to a lot owner, which either is or
may become of substantial benefit to him,
will be protected against closure by injunction. Prescott v. Edwards, 117 Cal. 298,
49 P. 178, as well as many other authorities,
are cited therein. See, also, Davidow v.
Griswold, 23 Cal.App. 188, 192, 137 P. 619;
Sees. 801 et seq., 1104, Civ.Code. The authorities cited support the findings and
iudgment of the court
[2-4] The remaining question involves
the ruling of the trial court in denying to
appellant the right to amend his answer to
include the defense of abandonment of the
easemenj: claimed by reason of the nonuser
thereof for over 14 years. No abuse of discretion appears in this respect for several
reasons. First, it was not originally alleged as one of the defenses to said action.
Second, mere nonuser does not necessarily
constitute abandonment 1 Caljur. p. 12,
§ 8; People v. Southern Pacific Company,
172 Cal. 692, 158 P. 177; Flanagan v. San
Marcos Silk Company, 106 Cal.App.2d
458, 235 P^d 107. The showing here made
does not indicate that the lot owners, as
such, had abandoned or intended to abandon
any of the so-called rights herein claimed,
nor is there any offer of proof indicating
this fact. Ocean Shore R. R. Co. v. Spring
Valley Water Company, 87 CaLApp. 188,
262 P. 53. It further appears that the trial
judge did give some consideration to this
contention and in his written opinion, as
pointed out by appellant, the court did make
a direct finding that there was no abandon-
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ment and that the showing of nonuser was
the only possible evidence of abandonment
produced. It therefore does not appear that
appellant would have been successful had
the court permitted him to plead abandonment. No prejudicial error appears in the
ruling of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.

ployment of an agent to sell realty must
show an authority to negotiate sale on behalf of owner. Civ.Code, § 1624.
3. Brokers <S»49(I), 50

To bind owner to pay a commission to
a broker authorized to sell real estate, broker must have sold real estate on the precise
terms of his contract and within the period
of his agency.

BARNARD, P. J., and MUSSELL, J.,
4. Brokers <§=>54, 84(2)
concur.
In action to recover commission for
sale of real property, even though broker
was authorized to negotiate, before com( o ! KIT MOMMft STSTiM>
mission would be earned, it was not sufficient that he had found a willing purchaser,
but purchaser must have had ability to pay
and the burden was on the broker to show
the financial ability of his prospective vendee.
H E R R I N G v. F I S H E R eta!.
Civ. 18852.

5. Brokers €=>43(2)

When provision of statute of fraud requiring some note or memorandum setting
forth the terms of employment of a person
to sell realty to be in writing, signed by the
owner has been met with reference to a
Action by Willard Herring against Floyd definite parcel, the agreement to pay a com0. Fisher, Elfleda Properties, Inc. to re- mission and its amount may be shown by
cover commissions for sale of real property.
parol. Civ.Code, § 1624.
The Superior Court, Los Angeles County
William S. Baird, J., entered judgment for 6. Brokers <§=>43(3)
plaintiff and defendants appealed. The DisIn, action to recover commission for
trict Court of Appeal, Moore, P. J., held sale of real property, a formal written authat broker, who was authorized by presi- thorization with all the terms agreed upon
dent of corporation to sell certain properis not essential to warrant a finding of emties for $20,000 net to vendors, where broployment.
ker brought the properties to vendee's attention, exhibited them to him and received 7. Brokers <§=>43(3)
his written offer to buy accompanied by
Letters written by an operator dealing
$500 as partial payment and thereafter in properties to a realty broker, which did
closed transaction directly with vendee
not designate property by legal description,
whereby vendors received $21,500, was entior
commission by percentage or specific
tled to compensation.
brokerage, but did describe the property by
Judgment reversed with directions.
a number on a public street and did fix the
McComb, J.f dissented.
price and specify the terms of the sale of
the property, were sufficient to coimply with
1. Brokers £=>7f 40
Mere action of an owner in naming a the statute of frauds requiring some note or
price in writing to a broker at which owner memorandum setting forth terms of emis willing to sell his real property does not ployment of a person to sell realty to be in
constitute an employment of the broker or writing, signed by the owner. Civ.Code, §
1624.
bind owner to pay a commission.
District Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 2, California.
April 8, 1952.

2. Brokers G=»43(2)

8. Brokers <§=>84(l)

In action to recover commission for
A memorandum of an owner to be sufficient under statute of fraud relative to em- sale of real property, where no commission,

